Myanmar: Bridging Narratives

By Josefine Roos, AC⁴ Fellow.

Since taking office in March 2011, President Thein Sein of Myanmar has taken important steps to improve the prospects for peace between the government (dominated by Myanmar’s ethnic majority, the Bamah) and the country’s ethnic minorities. A staggering twelve ceasefires have been signed with ethnic armed groups in the last year alone. Standing in the way of comprehensive peace agreements however are highly divergent historic narratives that shape the parties’ perception of the past and desires for the future. Conflicting parties often develop strong contradictory narratives. Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak., Bui-Wrzosinska, Bartoli, A. (2010), write that “strong enmity systems typically result in distinct and polarized narratives about the history of the conflict: who played the hero and villain roles and what is still at stake.” To transform the conflict in Myanmar these narratives must not only be understood, but the gap between them also needs to be bridged.

 Different Narratives

Myanmar has eight major minority ethnic groups with distinct traditions, languages, religions and degrees of autonomy from the Bamah majority throughout history. Though distinct in culture and identity, each share a similar narrative with respect to their historical relationship with the Bamah. For these minorities, the country that today is Myanmar is a collection of independent ethnic peoples bound only periodically by the conquest of the pre-colonial Bamah empire or the unification policy of the post-colonial Bamah majority government.

When the British colonizers came to Myanmar the country was not unified. Ethnic groups such as the Kachin fought alongside the British against the Bamah and again with the Allies during WW2. Only at the request of Aung San – metaphorical father of Burmese independence and literal father of modern day democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi – did ethnic groups such as the Kachin decide to join the independent Union of Burma. It’s founding document, the 1947 constitution, promised most ethnic minorities the right to secede and other freedoms that have subsequently been denied by successive Burmese governments. Since Burma’s independence in 1948, most of the country’s minority ethnic groups have been in conflict with the Bamah majority government, with periods of relative peace and cooperation punctuated by broken ceasefires and open warfare that continue to this day.

The ethnic narrative of independent identity, the right to self-determination, and the quest for fundamental freedoms shape both the ethnic minorities’ rationale for taking arms and their contemporary negotiation priorities. It helps explain how the groups are also struggling for justice rather than just accepting peace, why a ceasefire is meaningless without political dialogue, and why economic development alone is insufficient if the socioeconomic wellbeing and freedoms of ethnic peoples are not part of the peace dividend.

On the other side of the negotiating table the Bamah majority government has a very different conception of peace. Their narrative was established through the lens of the three periods when Burma was unified under one kingdom. The government’s priority is, and always has been, to strive for the unity of Myanmar. This is not “unity in diversity” as advocated by Aung San but a policy of Myanmarization that has been an evident if not explicit policy of successive Burmese governments. This policy – one people, one language, one religion – is antithetic to the ethnic narrative; a notion of unity that has been used to justify repression if not assimilation of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities.  Reconciliation with Myanmar’s ethnic minorities is less about recognizing their fundamental rights than it is about rebuilding the Bamah Empire. This narrative drives contemporary government negotiation priorities. Ceasefires are paramount. The violence must stop, unity must be promoted. The hinterlands must be stabilized and their peoples pacified before their lucrative economic potential can be unlocked.

Both groups will have to work hard to bridge a narrative that has widened over time. Smith (1999) writes how “insurgency as a way of life” has been infused in the ethnic  narrative after years of armed struggle and unmet needs.

A way forward?

Rob Ricigliano and his SAT model offers insight in bridging the narrative gap. He argues that in order to make peace last there needs to be change on three levels: structural (the systems and institutions designed to meet people’s basic human needs), attitudinal (the attitudes, norms and relationships that affect the level of cooperation between people), and transactional (the processes and skills used by key people to manage conflict and solve problems). Attitudinal change must be prioritized for each side to bridge the narrative gap. From the government’s side that means understanding that peace for the minority groups means much more than ending the fighting. For the ethnic groups this means recognizing the opportunity in joining a more democratic, reformist Burma and giving up insurgency as a way of life. For Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak., Bui-Wrzosinska, Bartoli, A. (2010) “mechanisms to monitor and revise such one-sided narratives are a key element for preventing future generations from returning to the same destructive patterns.” A long past of unmet expectations and broken cease fires has generated mistrust on both sides and strengthened respective arguments for militarized independence versus assimilation. This trend has to reverse.

If attitudes change, a shift in the transactional dimension becomes possible. Armed struggle can give way to political dialogue. President Thein Sein and chief negotiator Aung Min are already making positive steps in this direction, demonstrating willingness to participate in a constructive process and are encouraging a unified ethnic position. The ethnic minorities need to adjust their own style of business also, encouraging internal democratization so negotiators better reflect the interests of their constituents rather than narrow, militaristic agendas.

If the narratives can be bridged and the parties’ find constructive ways of working together, change in Ricigliano’s structural dimension will progress more smoothly. Educational and economic opportunities can increase, but the parties have a long way to go before these fruits of labour can be realized.