The \$3.5 Trillion Question: How to Make Natural Resource Funds Work for Citizens





What is a natural resource fund (NRF)?

Governmentowned Macroeconomic objective(s)

At least a portion invested in foreign assets

Source of financing: oil, gas or mineral revenues

NOT a bank, national oil company or central bank reserves

Looking at governance: 2 types of NRFs

Some have helped countries escape the "resource curse."

- Chile
- Norway
- Some Persian Gulf states
- Several U.S. states

Others have been mismanaged, not met objectives or become slush funds.

Some in :

- Central Asia (e.g., Russia)
- Latin America (e.g., Venezuela)
- MENA (e.g., Libya)
- SE Asia (e.g., Brunei)
- Africa (e.g., Equatorial Guinea)

What has made the difference are the rules, institutions and broad-based consensus.

Why this study?

Governance matters.

There is no international consensus on "good governance" or even "NRF".


Policymakers need tools and resources to establish or reform funds.


Is there a governance blueprint that can be followed to make NRFs work for citizens?

What did we do?

♦ Identified 54 NRFs (\$3.5 trillion in assets as of end-2013)

Breakdown of all 54 natural resource funds by size (USD) and principal source of financing





• Surveyed 22 NRFs in 18 national and subnational jurisdictions, based on institutional structure, investments, transparency, accountability and fiscal rules

What are our findings?


Each NRF profile includes a rating of good governance standards.

ABU DHABI

Each box represents a regulatory standard essential for promoting consistent use of and safeguarding resource revenues. White boxes highlight regulatory gaps in fund governance.

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Good Governance
Standards Met


Good Governance Standards and Gaps in Regulation




September 2013 Natural Resource Funds

What are our findings?

- \$3.5 trillion in AUM
- Massive proliferation of funds the new "must-have" for new producers
- Afghanistan, Israel, Kenya, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Peru, Uganda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia...
- NRFs adopting more rules, but major problems with compliance
- Some rules more common than others; more focus on management structure than investment risk limitations, transparency or oversight
- Funds becoming more transparent; yet only about half of the funds studied release audits or publish specific investments (most do not)



How to improve governance: a 6-step process



Step 1: Set clear fund objectives

Saving for future generations

Stabilization

Sterilizing capital inflows


Earmarking for specific expenditures

Ring-fencing resource revenues



What matters: clarity, consistent operational rules, adapted to the needs of the economy

Step 2: Establish fiscal rules



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Azerbaijan

Lack of a withdrawal rule

- Discretionary withdrawals
- Government spends lavishly when oil prices are high
- Leading to cuts when oil prices have declined

Alberta

Lack of a deposit rule

- Between 1987 and 2013 only two deposits made of less that \$4 billion combined.
- > Change in 2013

Chile

Even when fiscal rules are established by law, room for manipulation remains (e.g., Ghana, Trinidad and Tobago, Timor-Leste)

Chile has independent committees to make forecasts and fiscal assessments

Step 3: Establish investment rules

Need for explicit rules that limit risk

- ▲ Allocation between cash, fixed income investments, equities and alternative assets
- Prohibition of certain high-risk financial instruments or volatile currencies
- Limit use of resource revenues as collateral?

• Domestic investment directly by the fund or through the budget?

- No domestic investment: ADIA, Botswana, Chile, Kazakhstan, Norway
- Bypass the budget: Angola, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia

Step 3: Establish investment rules

Cautionary tales

- ▲ Angola from 2000-04, borrowed \$9 billion backed by oil during IMF debt restructuring negotiations
- ▲ Libya lost nearly all of \$1.2 billion investment in derivatives during the 2007-08 financial crisis

Step 4: Clarify good institutional structure

Stortinget (Norwegian parliament)

Government Pension Fund Act

Norwegian illustration

Ministry of Finance

Management mandate Ethical guidelines

Norges Bank (central bank) Executive Board

Executive Board principles Investment mandate CEO job description

NBIM committees Advisory forum to NBIM CEO

NBIM CEO

NBIM policies
The CEO also delegates investment
mandates and job descriptions

NBIM risk management and compliance

Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) Leader Group

The leader group sets specific investment guidelines and delegates work tasks

Step 5: Require extensive disclosure and audit

- Easy access to comprehensible legislation or quarterly reports that include:
 - governance rules
 - size of funds
 - returns on investments
 - specific assets
 - investment strategy
 - names of fund managers
- Public disclosure of internal and external audits

Step 6: Establish strong independent oversight

- Independent oversight promotes compliance with the rules.
- Managers of NRFs should be accountable to:
 - the legislature
 - comptroller, auditor-general or other independent formal supervisory body
 - the judiciary
 - civil society and the press
 - even the IMF or other policy institutes

Example:
Ghana's Public Interest
and Accountability
Committee (PIAC)

Working with small budget and no enforcement powers

Uses and future issues

Easy-to-access "benchmarks" against other NRFs:

- Website: www.revenuewatch.org/nrf
- Fund profiles
- Policy memos on NRF governance
- Interactive map

Training, capacity building and technical assistance

Strengthening governance:

Making NRFs work for citizens

Need international consensus on what constitutes good NRFs and advocate for consensus with governments

Thank you.

The full RWI-VCC report, briefs and NRF profiles are available at www.revenuewatch.org/nrf



