INTRODUCTION

Until recently, the most advanced form of grid-deployed energy storage\textsuperscript{2} involved pumping water up a hill.\textsuperscript{3} But “newer storage technologies like
flywheels and chemical batteries have recently achieved technological maturity and are well into successful pilot stages and, in some cases, commercial operation”. If widely adopted these new energy storage technologies will fundamentally alter the operation of our electricity system.

Energy storage carries electricity through time, just as transmission lines carry it through space—without it, electrical energy must be used at the instant it is generated. Storage resources transform electrical energy into another form of energy that can be stored and then used to regenerate electricity when needed. Because the United States grid has extremely limited energy storage capacity, grid operators must match the supply of thousands of generators with the load of millions of end users in an unceasing, moment-to-moment dance of staggering complexity. And the dance is only becoming more complicated as renewable resources like solar and wind—which have variable and unpredictable outputs—constitute an increasing portion of our generation mix.

stored energy (for example, thermal energy) that do not convert energy into electricity, but can substitute for electrical power by providing an end use, these types of energy storage are not the subject of this paper. Their function is limited to particular end uses beyond the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).

Pumped storage hydroelectric is the oldest form of energy storage. The earliest known use of pumped storage technology was in Switzerland in 1882. For nearly a decade, a pump and turbine operated with a small reservoir as a hydro-mechanical storage system. Beginning in the early 1900s, several small pumped storage plants were constructed in Europe, mostly in Germany. The first unit in North America was the Rocky River Pumped Storage plant, constructed in 1929 on the Housatonic River in Connecticut. See PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, at 24, available at http://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b1.pdf.


See, e.g., Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 95 FERC ¶ 61476 (June 29, 2001) (“Norton will use electrically-driven air compressors to produce compressed air, and in this sense, will convert one form of energy that is not storable (electric energy) to another form of energy that is storable (compressed air). This process (which, for convenience’s sake, we term the ‘conversion/storage cycle’) allows Norton to ‘store’ energy (as compressed air in the underground cavern) for extended periods of time (hence the term, ‘energy storage facility’). When demand for and the price of electric energy increase (that is, during peak hours), Norton will release the compressed air through gas-fired turbine generators, and in this manner, the energy in the compressed air will be converted back to electric energy”).

“Load” refers to an end-use device or customer that receives power from the electric system. It may also refer to the aggregate of loads, and in that usage is interchangeable with “demand”.

See, e.g., AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY ON THE GRID, at 8 (2010) (“[T]he variability of renewable resources . . . introduces uncertainty in generation output on time scales of seconds, hours and days. These uncertainties, affecting up to 70% of daytime solar capacity due to passing clouds, and 100% of wind capacity on calm days, are much greater than the relatively predictable uncertainties of a few per cent in demand that system operators now deal with regularly. Variability becomes increasingly difficult to manage as penetration levels increase.”).
The prospect of energy storage is nothing new, but a confluence of factors has occasioned an energy storage renaissance. Most importantly, certain advanced storage technologies have recently become cost-effective. At the same time, energy storage can address some of the major energy challenges of our time by enhancing the reliability, resiliency, and efficiency of our electricity system, while reducing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions. Among other benefits, energy storage resources can reduce our dependence on inefficient peaking plants, increase the capacity factor of existing generation and transmission infrastructure, and facilitate the integration of renewable resources—all with zero direct emissions.

Driving the storage renaissance is a dramatic surge in federal and state support. Through the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”), in a section called the United States Energy Storage Competitiveness Act, Congress allocated $295 million to the Department of Energy (“DOE”) each fiscal year through 2018 (about $2.7 billion total) to support the research, development, and demonstration of advanced storage technologies. Most recently, in early 2013, the Secretary of Energy announced a new Joint Center for Energy Storage Research, with $120 million to fund nanotechnological research.

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9 See supra, note __, discussing the origins of pumped storage.
11 In recent years, a variety of high-profile studies were published emphasizing the benefits and applications of various advanced energy storage resources. See generally EAC 2012, supra note __; JIM EYER & GARTH COREY, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, ENERGY STORAGE FOR THE ELECTRICITY GRID: BENEFITS AND MARKET POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT GUIDE (February 2010) (hereinafter “SANDIA 2010”), available at http://sgstage.nrel.gov/sites/default/files/resources/energy_storage.pdf.
12 “Capacity factor” is the ratio of actual generation (i.e. usage) to the maximum potential output (i.e. nameplate capacity), expressed as a percent. See FERC, Guide to Market Oversight, Glossary, at http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp.
13 The only storage resource with direct emissions is traditional compressed air energy storage. See infra, section I.C.
14 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 17231(p). The program is intended to promote “energy storage systems for electric drive vehicles, stationary applications, and electricity transmission and distribution”. Id. 42 U.S.C.A. § 17231. Congress also instructed the Secretary of Energy to establish an Energy Storage Advisory Council (“EAC”) within the Department of Energy (“DOE”), consisting of representatives of the energy storage industry. According to a recent GAO study, between fiscal years 2009 and 2012, the federal government allocated a total of $1.3 billion to research and development in advanced energy storage technologies. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BATTERIES AND ENERGY STORAGE (August 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/647742.pdf.
into advanced battery systems. The DOE has also used $185 million from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”) to provide matching funds for sixteen energy storage pilot projects, with a total value of $772 million and total capacity of 537MW. ARRA also established an Advanced Energy Manufacturing Tax Credit to support domestic manufacturing of energy storage devices and other advanced energy technologies through a 30% investment tax credit.

State interest in storage is strongest among states with aggressive Renewable Portfolio Standards and attendant grid reliability concerns. In 2010, through the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, New York established the New York Battery and Energy Storage Technology (“NY-BEST”). NY-BEST supports the in-state development and deployment of storage through funding, advocacy, and information sharing among its consortium of members. Meanwhile, in 2010, the California legislature enacted AB 2514, which instructed the California Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) to adopt an energy storage procurement target for state-regulated public utilities by October 2013. Even before finalizing its AB 2514 rules, the CPUC has made history by becoming the first state regulator to set an energy storage procurement target, mandating that Southern California Edison procure at least 50MW of energy storage as part of its long-term local capacity requirements for the Los Angeles Basin.

But federal regulations threaten to undermine the successful deployment of storage on the grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC” or “the Commission”) regulates the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate transmission and interstate wholesale energy transactions. While states regulate local distribution facilities and retail sales, substantially all electricity ultimately delivered to consumers in the United States passes through FERC’s jurisdiction. Depending on the circumstance, a storage device might behave like any of the traditional grid classifications: generation, transmission, distribution, and even load. These multifaceted operational characteristics, which make storage so

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18 See NY-BEST, About Us, at http://www.ny-best.org/About_NY-BEST.
19 See id.
22 See infra, section II.A.1.
useful, also confound regulatory rules and categories tailored to the more rigid operational characteristics of legacy technologies. Consequently, storage cannot compete on a level playing field with traditional resources in FERC-jurisdictional markets. This federal regulatory lag impedes the commercialization of technologies that the federal government itself supports with billions of dollars in funding, while obstructing the success of state policies promoting storage and renewable energy resources.23

Laudably, FERC has proactively addressed some particular barriers to storage, which this Article will discuss, but many significant barriers remain.24 Part I introduces energy storage, particularly its history, its operational uses, and its benefits. Part II introduces federal electricity regulation, and analyzes various FERC-jurisdictional opportunities and barriers to energy storage. It also highlights recent FERC actions that proactively address or incidentally impact energy storage resources. Finally, Part III proposes actions FERC should take to remedy identified barriers. In particular, it argues that FERC is required under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) to eliminate unjust, unreasonable, and unduly discriminatory barriers to energy storage in organized wholesale markets and resource adequacy planning processes. It then argues that the Commission should clarify its policies for classifying storage devices, without arbitrarily limiting storage resources from maximally benefiting the grid by performing multiple functions. Finally, it argues that energy storage resources should be considered comparably alongside traditional resources in transmission planning processes.

I. ENERGY STORAGE: TECHNOLOGIES, USES, AND BENEFITS

All storage resources do one thing in common: they store energy. But the catch-all term “energy storage” belies a diversity of technologies and applications. This section briefly introduces the electricity system. Then it establishes a framework for conceptualizing energy storage systems, and introduces the most

23 A123 Systems, Inc., a developer and manufacturer of advanced lithium ion batteries, was awarded a federal grant of as much as $249.1 million to establish battery manufacturing operations in Michigan, before it filed for bankruptcy in late 2012. See Bill Vlasic and Matthew L. Wald, Maker of Batteries Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (October 16, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/business/battery-maker-a123-systems-files-for-bankruptcy.html. In a conversation with the author, a representative of one major storage company opined that A123’s bankruptcy was not a result of technological immaturity or cost-ineffectiveness. Rather, A123’s debt commitments accrued faster than the company could commercialize its technologies because existing regulations simply do not adequately accommodate grid-deployed storage. After its reorganization, A123 remains a major player in the advanced energy storage sector, under the name A123 Systems, LLC.

24 In recent years, FERC has become increasingly proactive in developing and formulating policies and regulations to address new technologies and other emerging issues that affect FERC-jurisdictional energy and transmission markets. This may be in large part attributable to the Office of Energy Policy and Innovation (“OEPI”), announced in April 2009, and established in June 2010. See FERC, Delegations to Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, 75 FR 32657 (June 9, 2010). The OEPI focuses on, among other things, demand response, distributed generation, energy efficiency, smart grid standards, and storage. See FERC, Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, at http://www.ferc.gov/about/offices/oepi.asp.
mature energy storage technologies. Finally, it discusses the applications and benefits of grid-deployed energy storage. Rather than prefer one technology to another, this Article is technology-agnostic, focusing primarily on the various benefits to the grid of different storage applications.

A. The Electricity System: A Quick Primer

To understand how energy storage works, and how it benefits the grid, it is useful to first describe how our electricity system works. Electricity infrastructure is divided into three basic categories: generation, transmission, and distribution.\(^{25}\) The “bulk power system” includes long-distance transmission infrastructure and energy from large, centralized generators.\(^{26}\) Generation resources are usually location-constrained: wind is strongest in particular areas, for example, and dirty coal plants should not be sited in densely populated urban centers. Thus, a transmission grid is critical in that it moves power over long distances from sites of generation to areas of demand. The United States is divided into three such grids, or “synchronous interconnections”, known as the Western Interconnect, Eastern Interconnect, and the Texas Interconnect.\(^{27}\) The transmission grid ends where a high-voltage transmission line meets a step-down transformer connecting to the distribution grid, consisting of local, lower voltage lines that deliver electricity to end users.\(^{28}\)

Without energy storage, grid operators must ensure that the instantaneous supply of electricity meets constantly changing end-user demand. The varying need for heating, industrial uses, cooling, lighting, and other end uses drives daily and seasonal patterns. To satisfy demand, the United States bulk electricity system relies on a diversity of generation sources. In 2012, the United States’ net generation share by primary energy source was as follows: coal, 37%; natural gas, 30%; nuclear, 19%; hydroelectric, 7%; other renewables (wind, solar, biomass, etc.), 5%; and other sources, 2%.\(^{29}\) “Baseload” generators satisfy the significant, constant demand for electricity. Common baseload generators include coal, nuclear, and, increasingly, combined-cycle gas turbine (“CCGT”) plants.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{26}\) See 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2011) (The Energy Policy Act of 2005 defines the “bulk power system” as “facilities and control systems necessary for operating an interconnected electric energy transmission network (or any portion thereof); and . . . electric energy from generation facilities needed to maintain transmission system reliability. The term does not include facilities used in the local distribution of electric energy.”).

\(^{27}\) See RAP Guide, supra note __, at 15.

\(^{28}\) See id. at 65.


\(^{30}\) CCGT plants are the most efficient natural gas-fueled power plants, with efficiencies of up to 60%. Traditional gas plants have efficiencies only as high as 42%. See INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PROGRAMME, GAS-FIRED POWER, at 1 (April 2010), available at www.iea-etsap.org/web/E-TechDS/PDF/E02-gas_fired_power-GEN-AD-gct.pdf. With natural gas prices at historic lows (driven by the shale boom) and increasing
Most baseload plants have high capital costs but low variable costs, and are thus incentivized to run continuously and at a high capacity factor.\textsuperscript{31} Additionally, technical constraints (especially for nuclear plants) restrict rapid changes in output.\textsuperscript{32} To meet predictable daily demand fluctuations, grid operators usually call on hydroelectric and natural gas plants to serve as “intermediate” or “load following” units, which increase and decrease output to match daily load fluctuations.\textsuperscript{33} Finally, grid operators call on peaking plants, usually old, inefficient gas- or oil-fired turbines, to meet the very highest periods of demand.\textsuperscript{34} Peaking plants are capable of rapid ramping,\textsuperscript{35} and are thus able to respond quickly and accurately, within minutes or even seconds, to a request for increased or decreased energy output. Because load-following units are less efficient than baseload units, and peaking plants are yet worse\textsuperscript{36} the marginal cost of power—to generators, utilities, and ultimately, consumers\textsuperscript{37}—increases during peak hours, sometimes spectacularly during the highest peak days.\textsuperscript{38}

In addition to meeting the predictable daily and seasonal variations in demand, grid operators must keep additional reserves available to meet unforeseen, unpredictable, and/or rapid fluctuations in the balance of demand and supply. These reserve resources provide “ancillary services”, which FERC defines as “[t]hose services that are necessary to support the transmission of capacity and energy from resources to loads”.\textsuperscript{39} To provide ancillary services,

regulatory costs for coal generation, CCGT plants have become cost competitive with coal plants as a baseload resource, leading to so-called “coal-to-gas switching”. See, e.g., Ken Silverstein, \textit{Coal to Gas moves Are Generating Economic Waves}, FORBES (March 13, 2013), available at \url{http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2013/03/13/coal-to-gas-moves-are-generating-economic-waves/}.

\textsuperscript{31} See RAP Guide, supra note __, at 106.
\textsuperscript{32} See, e.g., World Nuclear Association, Nuclear Power Reactors (December 2012), at \url{http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Power-Reactors/Nuclear-Power-Reactors/}.
\textsuperscript{33} For a typical daily load profile, see, e.g., CAISO, Today’s Outlook (last checked April 9, 2013), at \url{http://www.caiso.com/outlook/SystemStatus.html} (showing real-time system demand, day-ahead demand forecast, hour-ahead demand forecast, and available resources in CAISO).
\textsuperscript{34} See EIA, Glossary, at \url{http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=P#peak_load_plant}.
\textsuperscript{35} Ramp is the rate, expressed in megawatts per minute, that a generator can change its output. See NERC, Glossary of Terms, available at \url{http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf}.
\textsuperscript{36} See, e.g., EIA, Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost of operation (August 17, 2012), at \url{http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590} (showing typical supply curve, or “generation stack”, and the increasing marginal cost (or variable operating cost) of generation).
\textsuperscript{37} The cost of electricity to consumers—the retail rate—has traditionally been set at a fixed price, regardless of the time of day or year. Some states are experimenting with incentive retail rates, or time-of-use rates, that vary depending on system demand, to send price signals to end users that accurately communicate the real-time marginal cost of wholesale power. Regardless, even consumers in fixed-rate regions ultimately pay for the high marginal cost of peak power because the fixed rate accounts for the full cost of power, if not in real-time. See RAP Guide, supra note __, at 55.
\textsuperscript{38} See, e.g., EIA, Texas Heat Wave, August 2011: Nature and Effects of an Electricity Supply Shortage (September 9, 2011), at \url{http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=3010} (discussing “super peak” prices in ERCOT during a heatwave in August, 2011, when real-time energy prices reached the market-cap $3,000/MWh).
\textsuperscript{39} FERC Guide to Market Oversight, Glossary, at \url{http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp}. 
meet predictable peak loads, and ensure adequate resources in case of a system contingency (such as an unplanned generator or transmission line outage) or a demand forecast error, bulk power systems generally maintain installed reserve capacity exceeding the annual projected peak load by a margin of around fifteen percent or more.40

B. The Origin of Energy Storage: or, Pumping Water up a Hill

The current surge of interest in energy storage centers on advanced storage systems, including batteries, flywheels, and other technologies, which are discussed below. But energy storage has been used for nearly a century in the form of pumped-storage hydroelectric power stations (“PSH”), i.e. pumping water up a hill, and later letting it fall back down. It seems so simple as to be a joke, but PSH is by far the most common form of energy storage currently in use.41 In the United States, there are forty PSH projects accounting for 22 GW, or about 2.2 percent of net summer capacity in the United States.42 PSH facilities consist of a lower and upper reservoir. Pumps move water to the upper reservoir when the system acts as a load, taking excess electricity from the bulk power system during off-peak hours and storing it as gravitational potential energy. When the grid requires additional energy, such as load following service, the system lets water fall to the lower reservoir, creating kinetic energy that turns turbines and generates electricity.43 PSH facilities may be closed-loop,44 or open to a natural waterway like normal hydroelectric dams. Round-trip efficiencies are around eighty-five percent, and in the United States, the capacities of PSH systems range from a few MW to 3000 MW.45

41 About ninety-nine percent of energy storage resources deployed globally are PSH. See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 2.
42 See EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 258 (September 2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/aer.pdf. Net summer capacity is “[t]he maximum output, commonly expressed in megawatts (MW), that generating equipment can supply to system load, as demonstrated by a multi-hour test, at the time of summer peak demand (period of June 1 through September 30.) This output reflects a reduction in capacity due to electricity use for station service or auxiliaries.” EIA, Glossary, at http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=net%20summer%20capacity.
43 The pump and the turbine is actually one mechanism, which either moves or is moved by water, depending whether energy is being stored or discharged. See NATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR NEW PUMPED STORAGE DEVELOPMENT, at 30 (July 2012), available at http://www.hydro.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/NHA_PumpedStorage_071212b1.pdf.
44 All operational PSH in the United States are open-loop systems. See id. But in a trend worth noting, an increasing share of proposed PSH projects are closed-loop. Closed-loop systems are considered less environmentally destructive than open systems, because they do not affect rivers and related resources, and can utilize abandoned mines that are already heavily impacted by human activity. These differences may make closed-loop systems easier to site and permit. See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage.asp.
The history of PSH illustrates the value of energy storage as an enabling and enhancing technology for other grid resources. Output from nuclear plants cannot easily be varied. Meanwhile, because of the enormous upfront capital cost of construction, and low variable and marginal costs of operation, nuclear plants are incentivized to run constantly and at high capacity factors. But in the early days of nuclear power, a vexing operational puzzle was how to maximize plant output where doing so would generate electricity in excess of off-peak system demand. Unlike peak loads, where demand exceeds baseload supply, the problem of nuclear was the opposite: when optimally utilized, a nuclear generator’s invariable baseload output might exceed the lowest trough in daily demand. Other baseload plants, like CCGT and to some extent coal, do not confront this issue because their output is more easily varied.

The solution reached was to construct PSH plants in connection with new nuclear generators. While conventional load-following or peaking plants can only add energy to the grid, storage resources like PSH can both add energy to the grid, and absorb energy from the grid for later use. Accordingly, the primary development of pumped storage power in the United States and worldwide occurred in the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s in parallel with the construction of a large number of nuclear power stations. Between 1970 and 1985, seventy percent of currently installed PSH capacity in the United States was constructed, with only thirteen percent constructed since. The below graph illustrates the historical relationship between nuclear and PSH.

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48 The reliable operation of the bulk electricity system requires supply to meet demand. An excess of energy, no less than an undersupply of energy, affects system stability.
50 Id.
Traditional PSH was designed as a time-shifting storage resource, to save excess generation during off-peak hours for use during daytime peak loads. Accordingly, all of the installed PSH in the United States have simple, single-speed pumps and turbines, only designed to save or generate electricity at a fixed rate. This limitation distinguishes PSH from other more nimble storage technologies, discussed below, which are capable of varying input and output to respond more rapidly and precisely to system needs, and thereby provide a variety of different services. Although adjustable-speed PSH systems have been developed elsewhere, notably Japan, none are currently deployed in the United States.

FERC statistics may indicate a revived interest in PSH. Under section 10 of the FPA, FERC has licensing authority over hydroelectric power projects, including PSH. Under section 10, an applicant may apply for a “preliminary permit”, which has “the sole purpose of maintaining priority of application for a license” for a duration not to exceed three years. As of March 2013, FERC has

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53 See id. at 30.

54 See id. This may change soon, however: in September, 2011, the Department of Energy, jointly with the Department of the Interior, awarded $6.8 million to an advanced PSH facility designed to “dynamically respond to the electrical grid”. DOE, Press Release, Departments of Energy and Interior Award Nearly $17 Million for Advanced Hydropower Technologies, at http://energy.gov/articles/departments-energy-and-interior-award-nearly-17-million-advanced-hydropower-technologies.


56 See id. § 798.
issued over forty active preliminary permits for PSH, with a total proposed
capacity of 49,673MW. In 2005, there were zero applications for a preliminary
permit, while in 2008, 2010, and 2011, there were over thirty per year. Interest
may be driven by the rapid growth in wind capacity, which has grown by an order
of magnitude in the last decade nationally, from 3,900MW of net summer
capacity in 2001 to 45,200MW in 2011. Wind has the inconvenient tendency to
blow stronger at night, when demand is lowest—an operational difficulty
strikingly similar to the stiff off-peak output of nuclear plants. Unlike nuclear
generators, wind turbine output can be reduced by adjusting blade pitch (also
called “feathering”), but foregone generation is wasteful and particularly
unfortunate for a resource with almost zero variable operating costs. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, over twenty percent of preliminary permits for new PSH are for
projects in California, where CAISO estimates that wind capacity will soon
exceed off-peak demand by 3,000 to 5,000MW.

PSH is an efficient energy storage technology for shifting bulk energy
generation and consumption, and adjustable-speed PSH may be capable of
providing other services. But PSH has a variety of limitations. Most
significantly, PSH require highly specific land formations to accommodate a
lower and upper reservoir. Moreover, like any hydroelectric facility, PSH have
significant land use footprints and attendant environmental impacts. Even if an
appropriate site were secured, in considering a license application for a new PSH

57 See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, Map of Issued Preliminary Permits (March 25, 2013),
at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-storage/issued-
permits.pdf.

58 See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, Map of Preliminary Permit Application Trends
(January 1, 2013), at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/pump-
storage/trends-pump-storage.pdf.

59 EIA, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 258 (September 2012), available at

60 See, e.g., EPRI, TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS, supra note __, at A-18 to 19.

61 See, e.g., EIA, Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost
of operation (August 17, 2012), at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590
(showing wind and other renewables at the low-cost end of the supply curve).

62 See FERC, Pumped Storage Projects, Map of Issued Preliminary Permits, at
(10,203MW of the 49,673MW of issued preliminary permit capacity for new PSH are located in
California.).

63 CPUC, POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION, ELECTRIC ENERGY STORAGE: AN ASSESSMENT
OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES, at 11 (2010), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/71859AF5-2D26-4262-BF52-
62DE85C0E942/0/CPUCStorageWhitePaper7910.pdf. California installed wind capacity has
grown three-fold in the last decade. See DOE, Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Wind
Powering America, Installed Wind Capacity, at

64 For example, FERC has issued a final environmental impact statement pursuant to NEPA
for one of two newly proposed and licensed PSH plants. The project, a closed-loop 1300MW
PSH plant located on the site of an inactive mine in Riverside County, CA, would require 2221.26
acres of land. See Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Proposed Eagle Mountain
Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Project (P-13123-002), January 30, 2012, available at
system under the FPA, FERC must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and complete a lengthy analysis of the proposed project’s impacts on the human environment.65 Other federal, state, and local laws applicable to land- and water-intensive projects may also slow PSH development, while offering a number of hooks for legal challenge.66 A final obstacle to PSH, and one which may make other technologies more attractive up front, is that PSH is the most capital intensive form of long-duration energy storage, with an estimated capital cost of $1275/kW of capacity.67

Perhaps indicative of the difficulty of finding an appropriate location and obtaining the necessary approvals, only two new PSH projects have come online in the last decade,68 and only two PSH projects, with a total capacity of 42MW, are planned for 2012-2016 according to the Energy Information Administration (“EIA”).69 Pumped storage will be discussed further in other sections of this Article, but current interest centers on advanced energy storage systems. New storage resources are often better performing and less location-constrained than PSH, while requiring fewer (if any) licenses or approvals (other than under electricity law). Moreover, advanced systems have become more cost-effective in recent years, and in some cases, have significantly lower capital costs. These more nimble resources are the primary focus of this paper.

C. Conceptualizing Energy Storage: Power, Duration, Energy

This section provides a brief technical overview of energy storage, and the criteria by which storage technologies are assessed and compared. Because this Article is technology-agnostic, the following discussion focuses more on operational characteristics than particular technologies.

Output from a conventional generator is only limited by the facility’s power capacity (also called “nameplate capacity”) and the availability of primary energy. In the case of thermal plants, like coal, natural gas, and nuclear, primary energy is practically unlimited. Thermal plants can generate electricity unceasingly for indefinite periods of time (assuming a stable source of primary fuel, and excepting occasional maintenance). Energy storage devices, on the other hand, are limited energy resources because they cannot indefinitely discharge energy and require recharging after a certain amount of use.

65 See, e.g., id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
66 For example, the Endangered Species Act may pose a significant barrier to open-loop PSH systems, projects that could jeopardize listed aquatic and other wildlife. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. Meanwhile, many state-level environmental review statutes, such as the California Environmental Quality Act, impose yet more stringent environmental review requirements than NEPA, leading to more development cost and delay for large PSH projects. See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 21000. Land use and water laws may also apply.
69 See id. at Table 4.5. Planned Generating Capacity Changes, by Energy Source, 2012-2016.
Energy storage devices can be analyzed along two axes, which together constitute a third: (1) power capacity, (2) duration of discharge, and (3) energy storage capacity. Power capacity is the maximum rate at which a resource can generate energy, expressed in kW or MW, and is comparable to the nameplate capacity of conventional generators. But unlike conventional generators, storage resources are time- and energy- limited. Duration of discharge is the duration over which a storage device can discharge at its rated power capacity. Finally, energy storage capacity is simply the total electrical energy a storage device can generate in one full discharge cycle, expressed in kWh or MWh (and is roughly found by multiplying power capacity by duration of discharge). Take for example a battery with a power capacity rating of 1MW, and a discharge time of 10 hours. In one full discharge cycle, the battery would produce 10MW h of energy, and would then require recharging. The below graph illustrates one way of conceptualizing the power-duration-energy framework.

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70 See id. at 2-4.
71 Notably, the nameplate capacity of a storage device is actually bi-directional. For example, the nameplate capacity of a battery might be 10MW, and -10MW, because it can also absorb energy. Thus, its net power capacity might be more accurately 20MW.
72 In battery terminology, the ratio of a battery’s power capacity to its energy storage capacity is called the “c-rate”. Thus, a flywheel with a power capacity of 20MW and an energy storage capacity of 5MWh would have a c-rate of 4C. On the other hand, a battery with a 20MW power capacity and 100MWh of energy storage capacity would have a c-rate of C/5.
73 This calculation (power x duration) is not exactly right. The efficiency of a device may vary with output. For example, a battery may have a power capacity of 10MW and discharge duration at that power output of 1 hour, which would equal 10MWh. But at 5MW power output, it might have a discharge duration of three hours, or 15MWh of energy. The difference is due to efficiency, and varies between different ES. The point, however, is that these three variables interact, and together define the operational limitations of any given energy storage resource.
In addition to the power-duration-energy criteria, energy storage devices have other critical operational characteristics. Most importantly, storage resources differ in how quickly they can respond to a request to adjust their generation or consumption rate. Similarly, storage resources differ in how quickly they can adjust output and how accurately they can track system requests. Below are descriptions of the four most mature storage technologies defined by reference to power, duration, energy, response, ramp, and accuracy.

**PSH and compressed air energy storage (“CAES”): high-power, long-duration, high-energy, quick-response, medium-ramp, medium-accuracy.** CAES, like PHS, harnesses mechanical energy to generate electricity. During off-peak hours, CAES systems pump air into a contained space, such as a subterranean cavern or closed tank. During peak hours, air is released, reheated, and passed through a turbine to generate electricity. By installed capacity, CAES is third to PHS and batteries, with about 400MW worldwide as of August 2012. However, while PHS and CAES are generally faster and more accurate than traditional generators, other storage resources are significantly more so.

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75 For a comprehensive and more detailed discussion of the various storage technologies, see generally EPRI, TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS, supra note __; CEC 2020, supra note __.

76 The graph above and the discussion below are only approximate. Particular instances of a given technology may defy the more general characteristics of the technology.

77 Conventional CAES involves reheating compressed air by combusting natural gas, making it the only storage resource with direct emissions. Conventional CAES is less efficient than PHS, with round-trip efficiency of about 50%. See id. at 40-45.

78 See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 21.
Moreover, traditional CAES and PHS are both severely location constrained, requiring highly specific land features, e.g. a salt cavern or tiered reservoirs, respectively.

Flywheels: low-to-medium-power, short-duration, low-energy, instantaneous response, fast-ramp, high-accuracy. Flywheels store kinetic energy during normal grid operation in heavy spinning cylinders. When a grid operator sends a signal that requests the system to absorb power, the flywheel uses power from the grid to drive the flywheel motor/generator, which in turn spins up the flywheel. When a signal is sent for electrical power to be provided, the momentum of the spinning flywheel drives the generator/motor and the kinetic energy is converted into electrical energy for release to the grid. Flywheels can discharge at their rated power capacity for about fifteen minutes. Importantly, flywheels can respond instantaneously and accurately to system signals, rapidly adjusting and alternating between output and input.

Batteries: low-to-medium-power, medium-to-long-duration, medium-to-high-energy, instantaneous-response, fast-ramp, high-accuracy. Batteries have emerged as the most flexible energy storage option, offering a range of power, duration, and energy capabilities. Moreover, unlike traditional PSH and CAES, batteries can be deployed as distributed resources closer to or at the “edge” of the grid, at the community level (also called Community Energy Storage (“CES”)), at load sites, or even as transportable resources deployed where- and as-needed. Driven in part by the technology developed in the emerging hybrid, plug-in hybrid electric, and electric vehicle sectors (collectively, “EVs”), battery technology has advanced significantly in recent years. Batteries use electricity to create and store chemical energy, and now account for about half of installed non-PSH energy storage globally, or 556MW, as of August 2012. Like flywheels, most batteries can ramp almost instantaneously and respond to system demand with precision unparalleled in conventional resources.

D. Uses and Benefits

As limited energy resources, and unlike conventional generators, energy storage resource applications must be time-limited. A variety of time-limited

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79 New CAES technologies are in development that may increase the efficiency and flexibility of CAES technology. See, e.g., LightSail Energy, at http://lightsailenergy.com/ (startup company developing high-efficiency, modular, distributable CAES). Likewise, new PSH technologies may make PSH less land-intensive and more nimble. See, e.g., CEC 2020, supra note __, at 38-40 (describing underground pumped storage technology).

80 Beacon Power is among the most prevalent companies in the flywheel sector. Their Smart Energy 25 flywheel stores energy by spinning at rates up to 16,000 RPM (or 267 rotations per second), levitated on hybrid magnetic bearings operating in a near-frictionless vacuum-sealed environment. Beacon owns and operates the largest flywheel in the United States, in Stephentown, NY. The 20MW flywheel facility consists of 200 high-speed 100 kW (25 kWh) flywheels. See Beacon Power, Smart Energy 25 Flywheel, at http://www.beaconpower.com/products/smart-energy-25.asp.

81 See id.

82 See id.

83 See CEC 2020, supra note __, at 167-78; SANDIA 2010, supra note __, at 128.

84 EAC 2012, supra note __, at 21.
services are critical to addressing operational challenges arising from the need to constantly and instantaneously match the supply and demand of electricity. Storage resources can perform these functions more reliably and more efficiently than traditional resources, while reducing emissions and the environmental footprint of the bulk power system. The following sections discuss various uses for storage on the grid, grouped under three basic benefit categories: reliability and resiliency, efficiency, and environment and climate.

1. Reliability and Resiliency

Enhanced transmission-side system quality: Storage resources can perform a variety of ancillary services critical to grid reliability and stability, in many cases better than traditional resources.\(^85\) Perhaps most promising, storage can be used to replace conventional reserves used for frequency control and other grid support services that require fast response and rapid ramping.\(^86\) Natural gas or hydroelectric generators, which currently perform ancillary services, can only add power to the grid and require minutes to respond. A flywheel or battery can respond instantly and ramp at rates significantly higher than traditional generators, within an effective operating range twice its rated capacity.\(^87\) Through faster and more accurate performance, storage resources provide up to four times more frequency control per-MW of capacity than traditional generators.\(^88\) Frequency control is widely considered the most cost-effective current application of energy storage.\(^89\) And fast and accurate grid support resources capable of ramping up and down will become critical to grid reliability with the growing penetration of renewables and electric vehicles.\(^90\)

\(^85\) Some ancillary services are discussed infra, at section II.B. Other transmission-side ancillary functions include providing system inertia, ramping, and voltage support. See SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON, MOVING ENERGY STORAGE FROM CONCEPT TO REALITY: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON’S APPROACH TO EVALUATING ENERGY STORAGE CURRENTLY, at 6 (2011), available at http://www.edison.com/files/WhitePaper_SCEsApproachtoEvaluatingEnergyStorage.pdf. Currently, fast-ramping generation resources like natural gas and hydroelectric plants are used for most ancillary services.

\(^86\) When the instantaneous supply and demand of electricity is equal, the grid’s high-voltage alternating current pulses at a frequency of 60Hz. The best analogy is a balancing scale: when the weights on each side (generation and load) are in balance, the scale is centered, and reads 60Hz. Minor frequency deviations affect energy consuming devices; major deviations cause generation and transmission equipment to separate from the grid, in the worst case leading to a cascading blackout. See FERC, Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064, at P5 (October 20, 2011).

\(^87\) A 50MW storage device, for example, has an approximate -50 to +50MW operating range that is equivalent to a zero to 100MW range for a combustion turbine for regulation purposes, because it can switch between charging from and discharging to the grid.


\(^89\) See EAC 2012, supra note 4, at 38-39.

\(^90\) See KEMA, supra note __, at 3 (noting that with increasing penetration of renewables, frequency regulation needs grow exponentially).
Enhanced distribution-side system quality: Similarly, on the distribution side, batteries and flywheels would be effective for providing ancillary services, including power quality and voltage control. Distribution-side concerns have magnified in recent years with increased penetration of distributed generation—especially rooftop solar photovoltaic (“PV”)—and EVs. With local and state governments promoting distributed generation and EVs throughout the country, storage will likely play a key role—whether as CES or distributed at load sites—in ensuring continuing distribution-side reliability.

Enhanced grid resiliency: Recent extreme weather events have prompted greater concern for grid resiliency. Superstorm Sandy, for example, left over eight million homes in the dark, some for over two weeks, and resulted in billions of dollars of power outage-related economic losses and related costs. Storage resources located downstream from system failures could carry critical load until system failures are resolved, including load-site storage resources used for uninterruptible power supply. Likewise, transportable storage devices like large batteries could be deployed to temporarily service affected areas. Storage could also serve as a blackstart resource to restore operation to generation facilities in the event of plant shut down and grid-wide outage, in lieu of diesel generators and costly blackstart interconnections. And unlike the alternatives, storage, including batteries and flywheels, respond instantaneously—indeed, so quickly that end users would be unaware of any difference in supply even during an emergency. Energy storage is also capable of improving the resiliency of the grid in the event of more routine contingencies, including transmission congestion or generation outages. For these applications, storage resources could replace

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91 See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 15-16.
92 See id.
95 See SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Edison, MOVING ENERGY Storage FROM Concept TO Reality: SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA Edison’S Approach to Evaluating Energy Storage Currently, at 21-22 (2011), available at http://www.edison.com/files/WhitePaper_SCESApproachtoEvaluatingEnergyStorage.pdf. For example, the erstwhile largest battery in the world, located outside Fairbanks, AK, is a nickel-cadmium battery with a discharge duration of seven minutes at a peak power of 40MW, or fifteen minutes at 26MW. The local electricity cooperative installed the battery to seamlessly power the region’s residents in the event of an outage because (1) outages are relatively common, since the entire region is dependent on a single intertie with Anchorage, and (2) the residents live in remote areas and extreme weather conditions, making unreliable electricity particularly dangerous. See Golden Valley Electrical Association, Battery Energy Storage System (BESS), at http://www.gvea.com/energy/bess.
96 A blackstart is the process of restoring a power station to operation without relying on the external electric power transmission network. Normally, a power station runs on its own energy. In the event of a total plant shut down, it might draw energy from the grid. However, power plants must be prepared to restart with self-supplied power, a so-called blackstart resource. See NERC, Glossary of Terms, at http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_of_Terms.pdf.
traditional generators that are kept online (spinning reserves) or offline but ready (non-spinning reserves) to compensate for lost capacity in the event of a contingency.\textsuperscript{97}

2. Efficiency

\textbf{Increased capacity factor of existing generation resources:} Most importantly, energy storage can increase the efficiency of the bulk power system by increasing the capacity factor of existing generation resources. As demonstrated in the case of nuclear and PSH, high-energy storage resources like batteries, compressed air, and PSH could permit greater reliance on efficient baseload facilities, and simultaneously, less reliance on costly traditional reserves and peaking facilities.\textsuperscript{98} Storage could likewise ensure that no energy from variable renewables goes unutilized by shifting off-peak energy to meet peak demand.\textsuperscript{99} Together, these deployments of energy storage would reduce the cost of meeting demand by reducing reliance on expensive generating reserves, resources that are constructed but mostly kept idle.\textsuperscript{100} For example, the average capacity factor of the two most common peaking plants, petroleum and (non-CCGT) natural gas turbines, was 7.8\% and 10.1\% respectively in 2009.\textsuperscript{101} In short, storage enhances the efficiency of cost-effective baseload and renewable generators, while reducing reliance on inefficient reserves and peaking facilities.

\textbf{Increased utility of existing transmission resources:} On the transmission side, storage would likewise improve the capacity of existing transmission infrastructure. For example, storage could alleviate transmission congestion and thereby defer the need for new transmission lines.\textsuperscript{102} Storage can also be used along the transmission or distribution system to defer other kinds of infrastructure upgrades. For example, storage is particularly valuable where

\textsuperscript{97} See infra, section II.B.
\textsuperscript{98} See supra, section I.B.
\textsuperscript{99} For example, wholesale electricity prices occasionally become negative on low-demand nights with a high penetration of inflexible generators, like wind, nuclear, and sometimes hydroelectric. See EIA, Negative prices in wholesale electricity markets indicate supply inflexibilities, at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=5110. Nuclear and hydroelectric generators in some cases simply cannot curtail their output. Wind generators, on the other hand, can curtail their output. But because they are currently eligible for a production tax credit of approximately $22/MWh, it is rational for wind generators to sell power for up to negative $22/MWh, i.e. to pay buyers up to $22/MWh. See id.
\textsuperscript{100} At the moment, these facilities, mainly oil and gas turbines, are the primary competition for energy storage from a purely economic perspective. With natural gas prices at historic lows, currently hovering around $3/Mbtu, the marginal cost of power from natural gas-fired operating reserves is relatively low, and sets the benchmark with which storage must compete.
\textsuperscript{102} Congestion occurs when flows of electricity over a line reach the physical or electrical capacity of the line or some related facility. In such instances, generators contributing to the congestion must be curtailed, and, since those were the least-cost generators, other more expensive generators must ramp up to ensure reliable grid operation. The result is higher electricity prices.
transmission line upgrades would be extremely capital intensive relative to the load to be served, as in remote areas.  

Cost savings to consumers: Without storage, electricity markets are highly volatile, especially during peak events and system contingencies that limit available supply. Even when markets are not supply constrained, the variable operating cost of generation—and thus the cost to consumers—increases dramatically during peak periods. By shifting cheap and efficient off-peak energy to peak periods, storage will promote price stability and enhance system efficiency by providing the same amount of power at a lower unit cost.

3. Climate and Environment

Zero direct emissions alternative to traditional reserves: With the exception of traditional CAES, energy storage resources have zero direct emissions, in stark contrast to the GHG-intensive reserves and peaking resources they would replace. Storage could be used to replace peaking resources on the supply side or shave peak demand through distributed deployment. Storage could also replace traditional reserves for providing ancillary services, many of which are held running in idle around the clock, wasting energy and emitting GHGs. Additionally, the physical environmental footprint of storage resources, particularly small distributed resources, is significantly less intense than traditional centralized generating reserves.

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103 Presidio, TX, on the Rio Grande border with Mexico, is connected to ERCOT by a single 60-mile transmission line built in 1948. The line goes out frequently. Instead of installing a new transmission line, which would cost about $50 million, the transmission utility sought and received permission from ERCOT to build a battery into its transmission asset rate base. Nicknamed the “Big-Old Battery”, or “BOB”, the battery has a power rating of 4MW (Presidio’s peak summer demand) and a discharge duration of 8 hours, at a cost of $25 million. The battery also acts as a source of reactive power to ensure power quality. See In Texas, One Really Big Battery, NPR (April 4, 2010), at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125561502.

104 See EIA, supra note __, discussing super peak prices in ERCOT.

105 The clearing price for wholesale power is equal to the highest dispatch price for any given period of time. Thus, the clearing price—the price all sellers are paid per MWh—is set by the most expensive and least efficient generator/seller. The cost and inefficiency of peaking resources is orders of magnitude higher than baseload plants. See, e.g., EIA, Electric generator dispatch depends on system demand and the relative cost of operation, at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7590 (showing hypothetical supply curve with rapidly increasing marginal cost at and above peak load).

106 Cost-effective energy storage resources would at once increase demand during off-peak hours and decrease demand during on-peak hours. Consequently, storage increases the capacity factor of the cheaper, more efficient generation fleet, and reduces the capacity factor of the less efficient, more expensive fleet. The latter may very well be pushed out of the generation stack altogether.


Maximizing the capacity factor of renewable resources: Energy storage devices are efficiency-enhancing technologies for renewable resources. Many renewable energy resources, wind and solar in particular, are variable, non-dispatchable resources, whose output can neither be entirely controlled nor predicted. By shifting excess off-peak wind energy to meet on-peak demand, high-energy storage resources could firm variable capacity and maximize the utility of renewable resources. Without storage, output from variable clean resources may at times exceed system demand, and thus go wasted.\(^\text{109}\) Storing unneeded off-peak energy for use during peak hours would enhance system efficiency and increase revenues for these inflexible but cost-effective generators.

Enabling renewables integration: Equally important, storage can address severe reliability concerns that may otherwise limit increased penetration of renewables.\(^\text{110}\) On the one hand, the grid must be kept reliable. On the other hand, maintaining reliability by ramping up and ramping down inefficient fossil fuel plants, although a means to grid stability, would substantially undermine the central purpose of developing renewables in the first place: reducing GHG emissions.\(^\text{111}\) Subsequently, clean energy storage has gained significant attention in recent years. In particular, batteries and flywheels would be effective for smoothing variable output and providing rapid frequency and voltage control.\(^\text{112}\) Fast-ramping storage resources would also be effective for handling predictable but more significant fluctuations in net load.\(^\text{113}\) For example, the graph below shows CAISO’s projected net load through 2020. The projected net daytime load decreases from 2013 to 2020, due to increasing penetration of RPS-driven daytime solar output.\(^\text{114}\) Subsequently, the net load difference between daytime and evening peak increases sharply, resulting in a very rapid, significant change in

\(^{109}\text{See supra, note 62, relating to CAISO’s estimate that wind capacity will soon exceed off-peak demand by 3,000 to 5,000MW in its region. See supra note __, discussing negative wholesale prices.}\)

\(^{110}\text{See, e.g., AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY, INTEGRATING RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY ON THE GRID, at 3 (2010) (“As renewable generation grows it will ultimately overwhelm the ability of conventional resources to compensate renewable variability, and require the capture of electricity generated by wind, solar and other renewables for later use.”).}\)

\(^{111}\text{A Carnegie Mellon University study estimated that 20 percent of the CO}_2\text{ emission reduction and up 100 percent of the NO}_X\text{ emission reduction expected from introducing wind and solar power will be lost because of the extra ramping requirements they impose on traditional generation. Katzenstein, W., and Jay Apt, Air Emissions Due To Wind and Solar Power, ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (2009) 43, 253-258, available at http://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/es801437t}\)

\(^{112}\text{The largest grid-deployed battery attached to a wind farm was recently brought online in Texas. See DOE, Smoothing Renewable Wind Energy in Texas (April 9, 2013), http://energy.gov/articles/smoothing-renewable-wind-energy-texas.}\)

\(^{113}\text{Net load is gross load minus non-dispatchable renewable generation. Thus, it is the load that a grid operator must satisfy through dispatchable resources.}\)

\(^{114}\text{Mark Rothleder, CAISO, Long Term Resource Adequacy Summit, Presentation at 3 (February 26, 2012), available at http://www.caiso.com/Documents/Presentation-Mark_Rothleder_CaliforniaISO.pdf. This graph is nicknamed the “Duck Graph”, for obvious reasons.}\)
net load during dusk and early evening.\textsuperscript{115} Fast ramping energy storage resources will be critical in maintaining system stability during these periods of rapid and volatile net load change.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Net_load.png}
\caption{Projected net load in CAISO through 2020.\textsuperscript{116}}
\end{figure}

**Enabling distributed renewable generation:** Increased penetration of distributed renewable generation—especially PV panels on rooftops\textsuperscript{117}—raises distribution-side reliability problems because PV has variable output and causes voltage instabilities.\textsuperscript{118} In decentralized deployment, whether as CES or at individual load sites, storage would facilitate more widespread installation of distributed solar PV generation by providing critical distribution-side reliability services, like voltage control and power quality.\textsuperscript{119}

**Enabling electric vehicle integration:** EVs will constitute an increasing portion of the United States vehicle fleet in coming years.\textsuperscript{120} When charging, EVs are significant loads. In areas with high EV penetration, handling EV-related

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Id.} The rapid change in net load is like the net velocity of two cars driving in opposite directions on a highway. Each may be moving 60 mph, but combined, their net velocity is 120 mph. In the graph, solar generation drops off just a bulk of the population returns home for energy-intensive evening activities, involving air conditioners, televisions, and other load-heavy end uses. The net load result is dramatic.

\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{117} California, for example, has already installed over 1.5 GW of rooftop distributed PV generation. \textit{See} Chris Clarke, KCET, ReWire (March 14, 2013), \textit{at} http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/solar/photovoltaic-pv/a-different-solar-milestone-15-gigawatts-of-rooftop-in-california.html.

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{See} EAC 2012, \textit{supra} note __, at 15-16.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{See id.}

demand will involve novel grid reliability challenges. Fast-ramping and accurate storage resources can address these reliability concerns, easing the integration of EV load into the grid.\textsuperscript{121} Simultaneously, EVs can be utilized as storage resources themselves, in particular for providing grid support functions.\textsuperscript{122} As a revenue opportunity for EV owners, the establishment of vehicle-to-grid market rules and operational protocol could incentivize more widespread adoption of EVs.\textsuperscript{123}

II. ELECTRICITY REGULATION AND ENERGY STORAGE: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Advanced storage resources clearly hold great promise. Recent developments in federal electricity regulation have opened opportunities for storage, at times directly targeting discriminatory rules and practices that kept energy storage from competing on a level playing field with other resources. But unjustified barriers remain, in both organized wholesale markets and regions with incumbent transmission utilities. After briefly introducing the structure and functions of federal electricity regulation, this section discusses particular opportunities and barriers to grid-deployed storage, focusing particularly on FERC orders and policies.

A. Background

1. FERC Jurisdiction and Statutory Mandate

In simple terms, electricity is subject to jurisdiction divided between the states and the federal government. The boundaries of federal jurisdiction remain grounded in the Federal Power Act of 1935 ("FPA"), which vested in the Federal Power Commission (now FERC) plenary jurisdiction to regulate the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in interstate commerce".\textsuperscript{124} The FPA defines "sale of electric energy at wholesale" as "a sale of electric energy to any person for resale".\textsuperscript{125} While FERC’s jurisdiction extends only to wholesale transactions, its authority is broadened to reach a variety of intrastate wholesale transactions by virtue

\textsuperscript{121} See CEC 2020, supra note __, at 180-81. ("The delivery of so much electrical power in a short period of time could stress the local distribution network, so the addition of energy storage between the grid and Level 3 [EV] chargers could provide needed buffering.").


\textsuperscript{123} See id. ("When the cars work with the grid, they earn about $5 a day, which comes to about $1,800 a year").

\textsuperscript{124} 16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. Prior to the FPA, states regulated all aspects of electric utility service, until state authority over interstate electricity transactions was invalidated under the dormant Commerce Clause. See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attechboro Steam Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). Congress enacted the FPA to fill the so-called “Attleboro gap”, in which interstate power transactions and transmission were subject to no regulator.

\textsuperscript{125} 16 U.S.C.A. § 824(d).
of the grid’s interconnectedness and essentially interstate character. FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate transmission is yet more broadly construed, extending not only to interstate transmissions of wholesale power, but also interstate transmission of unbundled retail electricity. In practice, FERC regulates the rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale sales of electric power for resale in interstate commerce, and the rates, terms, and conditions of interstate transmission.

Notwithstanding the FPA’s broad grant of authority, the statute limits FERC’s authority to “those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States”. The FPA expressly reserves state jurisdiction over “facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce”. In practice, state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) regulate the retail rates charged to end-use consumers, the lower-voltage distribution infrastructure that delivers electricity to end users, and the construction and siting of transmission and generation facilities.

“[W]ith respect to any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission”, FERC must ensure that rates are “just and reasonable” and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. Traditionally, FERC has utilized a “cost-of-service” approach to rate regulation, setting rates to meet revenue requirements that provide a rate of return on equity adequate to attract investors. Courts initially interpreted the “just and reasonable” standard as requiring agencies to employ a particular cost-of-service methodology, until 1944 when the Supreme Court held that the “result reached” in the ratemaking process, rather than the

126 See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 458 (1972) (sufficient to show that power from intrastate transaction “commingled” with power from interstate transaction); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61 (1943) (sufficient to show that party in intrastate transaction was “no more than a funnel” to party out of state). Cf. 16 U.S.C.A. § 824 (“[E]lectric energy shall be held to be transmitted in interstate commerce if transmitted from a State and consumed at any point outside thereof”).

127 In New York v. F.E.R.C., the Supreme Court held that the plain language of the FPA supported the Commission’s assertion of jurisdiction over unbundled retail transmission in interstate commerce. “The unbundled retail transmissions targeted by FERC are indeed transmissions of ‘electric energy in interstate commerce,’ [16 U.S.C. § 824(b),] because of the nature of the national grid. There is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale.” 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002) (emphasis in original). See also Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (decision below).


129 Id. § 824(b)(1).


132 “The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the money market and business conditions generally.” Bluefield Waterworks & Imp. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679, 693 (1923).
methodology used, would determine whether the rate was “just and reasonable” under the FPA.\footnote{Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944). In the Permian Basin Rate Cases, the Supreme Court further held that a court must uphold an agency’s decision to authorize particular rates if those rates fall within a “zone of reasonableness.” In re Permian Basin Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767 (1968) (citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585 (1942)). Judge David Bazelon once described the “zone of reasonableness” as “bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and at the other by the consumer interest against exorbitant rates.” Washington Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950).}

Within its zone of ratemaking discretion,\footnote{In considering FERC’s tariff-approving authority, the Supreme Court has emphasized “that the just and reasonable standard does not compel the Commission to use any single pricing formula”. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast Inc. v. United Distribution Co., 498 U.S. 211, 224 (1991) (discussing the “just and reasonable” requirement in the natural gas context).} FERC began in the early 1980s to entertain what were, at the time, “highly unusual” rate filings, requesting approval of “market-based” (rather than cost-of-service) rates for wholesale power.\footnote{Re Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico et al., 25 FERC ¶ 61469 (Dec. 30, 1983).} FERC determined that negotiated market-based rates are “just and reasonable” under the FPA, but the entity proposing such rates must not have, or must have adequately mitigated, market power in generation and transmission and must not control other barriers to entry.\footnote{See, e.g., Citizens Power & Light Corp., 48 FERC ¶ 61210 (Aug. 8, 1989). Courts have approved FERC’s use of market-based rates as consistent with the FPA’s “just and reasonable” standard. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. F.E.R.C., 383 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2004); Louisiana Energy & Power Auth. v. F.E.R.C., 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The economic policy argument for authorizing market-based power rates is simple: transmission and distribution are natural monopolies, but the generation and sale of electricity itself is not. See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 417, 418 (2005). Competition, in theory, increases efficiency and drives down prices for consumers, leading to inherently more just and reasonable rates. See Order No. 697, Mkt.-Based Rates for Wholesale Sales of Elec. Energy, Capacity & Ancillary Services by Pub. Utilities, 119 FERC ¶ 61295 (June 21, 2007), order on reh’g, 121 FERC ¶ 61260 (Dec. 14, 2007); order on reh’g, 131 FERC ¶ 61021 (Apr. 15, 2010).} Rather than specifically approve market-based rates, the Commission grants market actors market-based rate authority, pursuant to rules codified through a number of orders.\footnote{See, e.g., FERC, Letter order conditionally accepting Stephentown Regulation Services, LLC’s 6/7/10 filing of an application for market-based rate authority with an accompanying rate schedule, effective 8/2/10 under ER10-1403, available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/openmnt.asp?fileID=12386870.} FERC has approved a number of storage facilities for market-based rate authority.\footnote{See FERC EQRs. However, some market-based rates have also emerged to a lesser degree for transmission. See Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make A Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 421 (2011).} Over ninety-nine percent of wholesale power transactions occur under market-based rates, whether through bilateral agreements or organized markets, while nearly all transmission service is offered under cost-of-service rates.\footnote{Over ninety-nine percent of wholesale power transactions occur under market-based rates, while nearly all transmission service is offered under cost-of-service rates.}

2. Grid Operators: ISO/RTOs and Transmission Utilities

In encouraging market-based rates and competition among wholesale generators and sellers, the Commission has promoted the creation of organized...
wholesale markets and independent grid operators, called Independent System Operators ("ISOs") or Regional Transmission Operators ("RTOs").

There are currently six independent operators in the United States that are subject to FERC, which together with ERCOT in Texas, service two-thirds of electricity consumers in the United States. ISO/RTOs administer the grid under OATTs filed on behalf of transmission owners, under which transmission customers pay regulated rates for transmission service. Under rules promulgated by FERC, RTOs/ISOs perform the following tasks:

- Dispatch—the commands to turn on, turn off, hold in readiness, or repair significant generating units;
- Transmission scheduling—the decisions to open, close, or reserve transmission lines and to schedule, implement or defer desired maintenance;
- Planning—the projection of expected demand and potential and preferred ways of meeting that demand, whether through capacity auctions or resource adequacy requirements;
- Market management—conducting auctions for energy and ancillary services which give participants the price signals to match scheduled load with expected demand;

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140 Organized wholesale markets for energy, capacity, and ancillary services emerged from FERC Orders No. 888, 889, and 2000. Order No. 888 established the foundation for competitive electricity markets, by requiring open, nondiscriminatory access to transmission facilities. Order No. 888 specifically required transmission utilities to file a nondiscriminatory open access transmission tariff ("OATT"), separately stating (i.e. "unbundling") rates for energy, transmission, and ancillary services. In addition, Order No. 888 required transmission utilities to take transmission service under the OATT on equal terms with non-utility users, such as IPPs. Order No. 888 also encouraged utilities to cede functional control of transmission assets to an ISO, to avoid conflicts of interest and ensure nondiscriminatory open access for non-utility generators. Order No. 2000 further encouraged formation of RTOs to transfer functional control of the bulk power system to an independent operator, and promote regional coordination of transmission facilities. The Commission provided comprehensive guidelines as to the minimum functions and characteristics of properly organized RTOs. Notably, neither Order No. 888 nor Order No. 2000 required formation of such independent operators; thus, grid operators in some regions are ISO/RTOs, and in others the incumbent transmission utilities retain control. See Clinton A. Vince, Sherry A. Quirk, Stanley P. Wolf, Travis R. Smith, Sandra & Barbulescu, Monica Berry, What Is Happening and Where in the World of RTOs and ISOs?, 27 Energy L.J. 65, 66-74 (2006).


142 See ISO/RTO Council, Homepage, at http://www.isorto.org/. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) is not subject to FERC under the FPA because the ERCOT grid does not synchronously interconnect with any facilities outside the state of Texas, and thus does not engage in interstate transmission or interstate wholesale power transactions.

143 See supra, note 139, discussing OATTs under Order No. 888.

144 An independent operator is a "public utility" subject to FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(e). FERC may withdraw its market-based rate authorization for an ISO/RTO that does not comply with its directives.
• Market monitoring—maintaining market discipline based upon monitoring for and enforcement of sanctions for that abuse; and
• Rate collection—the collection of billions of dollars through charges on the use of monopoly transmission facilities to be distributed to transmission owners in ways that will compensate past and incentivize future investment.  

On the other hand, other regional grids outside the RTOs/ISOs—particularly the Southeast, Southwest, Inter-Mountain West, and Northwest—remain operated by traditional, vertically-integrated utilities. In those regions, the utilities retain operational control and reliability responsibilities for transmission service. Non-utility entities can utilize transmission facilities pursuant to an OATT, which in theory provides open nondiscriminatory transmission service for IPPs and other third-party service providers; however, in practice, the utilities can freely satisfy power and other service requirements with their own facilities, rather than buying services from IPPs or others. In these markets, independent energy providers generally engage in bilateral contracts with incumbent utilities, LSEs, or directly with bulk loads (e.g. industrial or large commercial facilities).

B. Ancillary Services

Ancillary services are services necessary to ensure that capacity and energy are capable of constantly matching bulk load. Historically, ancillary services have been performed by traditional generators. In Order No. 890, FERC amended its pro forma OATT to require that ISO/RTOs and transmission utilities permit “other non-generation resources” to provide ancillary services, thus opening the opportunity for resources like storage and demand response to provide ancillary grid functions. Typically, ISO/RTOs require LSEs (i.e. wholesale customers) to procure ancillary services in proportion to their loads, either through self-supplying, bilateral agreements, or organized wholesale markets. Outside of ISO/RTOs, transmission utilities charge regulated ancillary service rates, listed separately on an OATT, or permit transmission customers to self-supply. Although transmission operators use a variety of names, ancillary services are commonly grouped into three categories, approximately organized from quickest response and shortest duration, to slowest response and longest duration: primary, secondary, and tertiary frequency control.

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146 See Bosselman, et al., supra note __, at 656.
148 See id.
149 This framework is suggested in SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, PROJECT REPORT: A SURVEY OF OPERATING RESERVE MARKETS IN U.S.ISO/RTO-MANAGED ELECTRIC ENERGY
Storage resources can perform ancillary services comparably and in many instances more reliably and efficiently, and with less environmental impact, than traditional generators. But the Order No. 890 promise to ensure comparable participation of non-generation resources in ancillary service markets is incomplete. Recently, FERC has acted to remedy undue discrimination in secondary frequency control markets, but barriers to storage resources remain in markets for other ancillary services.

1. Primary Frequency Control: Frequency Response

Primary frequency control, or frequency response, is performed by an automatic, autonomous resource that instantaneously adjusts output or load to offset significant abrupt changes in frequency. Primary frequency control acts to arrest a sharp drop or spike in frequency in real-time. It is designed to keep the frequency within specified limits in response to the unexpected forced outage of a generator or transmission facility, or the loss of a large load, to prevent frequency excursions that compromise system security and could lead to a blackout. Once the frequency deviation is arrested, the grid operator dispatches secondary and tertiary frequency control resources (discussed below) to ensure longer-duration stability.

A recent FERC-commissioned study observed that “[t]he declining quality of frequency control in the U.S. interconnections is currently a significant reliability concern”, and particularly emphasized that “[t]he amount of primary frequency control reserves that are on line and always available may be reduced as the conventional generation-based sources for these reserves are displaced by variable renewable generation, which currently does not provide primary frequency control”. As a solution, among other measures, the study recommended “[e]xpanded use of advanced technologies, such as energy storage” for primary frequency control.

Storage resources, especially batteries and flywheels, are excellent frequency response resources, responding more quickly and accurately to sudden frequency disturbances than conventional generators and demand response resources. Moreover, storage resources combine the characteristics of


\(^{151}\) For a description of frequency on the grid, see supra note ___.


\(^{154}\) Id.

generation and demand response in a single resource, with the capability of controlling both up (by discharging) and down (by charging). Deploying storage for primary frequency control would replace the frequency control provided by retiring traditional generators, and also free up generators currently serving as frequency response resources to generate more energy (rather than reserve capacity for performing primary frequency response).

Notwithstanding the study’s recommendation, energy storage resources currently have extremely limited prospects as primary frequency control resources. Primary frequency control is not provided through wholesale markets in any of the ISO/RTOs. Although FERC has recognized that traditional frequency response resources will soon become inadequate, ISO/RTOs continue to rely on a combination of conventional generation and, to a limited extent, demand response resources. Without a wholesale market and/or performance-based incentives for frequency response that account for storage resources’ inherently greater frequency response capabilities, storage resources have no opportunity as frequency response resources inside or outside of organized markets.

2. Secondary Frequency Control: Frequency Regulation

Secondary frequency control, or frequency regulation, is the rapid injection or withdrawal of real power by facilities capable of responding automatically to a grid operator’s signal, generally within minutes. Like frequency response, frequency regulation is critical for ensuring that, on the margin, generation continuously matches load to maintain system frequency within a one percent deviation from 60Hz. Because of its operational characteristics, and the existence of wholesale frequency regulation markets, the currently most commercially viable storage application is frequency regulation.

However, the compensation practices of most ISO/RTOs and transmission utilities—designed for the functional characteristics of conventional generators—do not all account for the inherently greater frequency regulation provided by

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157 The frequency regulation signal is called an automatic generator control (AGC) signal. Frequency regulation resources are designed to automatically respond to the AGC, rather than require manual control. The signal is updated every 4 or 6 seconds, depending on the system. Frequency regulation is not to be confused with primary frequency control, or frequency response. Regulation behaves in response to the AGC, which is usually dispatched when frequency deviates a certain percentage from its baseline, whereas frequency control/response acts automatically in response to changes in system frequency itself. See FERC, Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064 (October 20, 2011).

158 See supra, note 84.

certain accurate, fast-ramping storage devices. Laudably, FERC has recently acted to remedy such unjust and unreasonable market rules, constituting the Commission’s first major—albeit piecemeal—actions toward ensuring comparable treatment of storage resources.

Frequency regulation: the regulation signal (red) is dispatched to compensate for minute-to-minute discrepancies between total system load (green) and load-following generation (blue).

i. Order No. 755 and Frequency Regulation in ISO/RTOs

Through Order No. 755, FERC successfully identified and remedied undue discrimination in frequency regulation markets, by requiring ISO/RTOs to adapt market rules to account for the performance characteristics of certain storage resources. Frequency regulation is sold and procured through organized wholesale markets as needed to maintain grid stability. Today, most frequency regulation is provided by traditional generators, such as fast-ramping natural gas turbines. The faster a resource can ramp up or down, the more accurately it can respond to the AGC signal and avoid over or under performing. Alternatively, when a resource ramps too slowly, its ramping limitations may cause it to work

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162 Order No. 755, 137 FERC ¶ 61,064 (Issued October 20, 2011).
against the needs of the system and force the system operator to commit additional regulation resources to compensate.  

Under compensation practices prior to Order No. 755, resources were not compensated for actual frequency regulation provided to the grid. In many instances resources affording inherently different levels of regulation were compensated identically. For example, the Commission found that some ISO/RTOs compensated regulation resources for a flat rate based simply on the amount of capacity devoted to regulation, plus a payment or charge for net energy used. Thus, for example, 10MW of flywheel capacity might be compensated equal to or less than 10MW of natural gas plant capacity, even where the battery had tracked the dispatch signal with far greater precision and effectively committed 20MW of capacity (10MW down, plus 10MW up), thus affording the system substantially more regulation service.

![Diagram: 2/179 MW LERS Actual Output vs. 9 MW Generator with Minimum Allowable Response Time of 5 minutes](http://www.beaconpower.com/files/Beacon_Power_presentation_ESA%206_7_11_FINAL.pdf)

Relative frequency regulation of conventional generator (red) and a flywheel (blue), in following regulation signal. These resources would be compensated identically under pre-Order No. 755 rules in most ISO/RTOs.

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163 See id. at P4-5.


In response to this and other discriminatory rules in frequency regulation markets, Order No. 755 mandates that ISO/RTOs compensate for actual frequency regulation performed, through a two-part payment: (1) payment for performance that reflects the quantity of frequency regulation service provided by a resource when the resource is accurately following the dispatch signal, and (2) a capacity payment reflecting the marginal unit’s opportunity costs.\footnote{See Order No. 755.}

The first, the so-called “mileage payment”,\footnote{The mileage payment is so called because it compensates for the distance traveled, regardless of whether the movement was up or down. FERC seems unwilling to define the performance payment without absolute actual mileage as a component. For example, the Commission rejected PJM’s Order No. 755 compliance filing to the extent it did not make the performance payment specifically contingent on total mileage, “find[ing] that the regulatory text adopted by Order No. 755 is clear”. See P.J.M. Interconnection, LLC, 141 FERC ¶ 61,134, at P16 (November 16, 2012).} ensures that resources are compensated for their actual performance, based on the absolute amount of regulation up and down a resource provides in response to the system operator’s dispatch signal. As in the above graphic example, fast-ramping resources can perform substantially more frequency regulation work than a traditional slower-ramping resource in a given period of time.\footnote{See also KEMA, supra note __, at 6.} Moreover, storage devices can regulate down, by charging and actually taking generation in excess of load off the grid. Regulating down is as important to grid reliability as regulating up, but many organized markets have no mechanism for compensating such performance because, quite simply, the rules were designed for traditional generators, which can only regulate up. FERC also specifically required that the performance payment be market-based, to ensure the least-cost and most efficient dispatch of regulation resources.\footnote{See Order No. 755, at P128-30.} Layered onto the mileage payment, FERC required compensation to account for the accuracy with which a regulation resource tracks the operator’s dispatch signal. Batteries and flywheels generally track dispatch signals with far higher precision and accuracy than traditional generators, providing high value regulation while avoiding costly inaccuracies that might require additional corrective regulation. Although FERC did not require any particular accuracy metric, the Commission required that all resources be gauged by the same one.\footnote{See id. at P153.}

Similarly, the Commission required that all resources be compensated at a uniform market-based capacity payment equal to the marginal unit’s stated opportunity cost. FERC required a uniform clearing price, to ensure an efficient preference for resources with lower opportunity costs of participating in regulation (rather than other, e.g. energy) markets.\footnote{See id. at P99.}

In Order No. 755, FERC identified and remedied market rules that did not adequately account for the novel operational characteristics of certain storage resources. In doing so, FERC leveled the playing field for a variety of new technologies, particularly batteries and flywheels, while making the market for
frequency regulation more competitive and efficient.\textsuperscript{172} The elimination of barriers in the provision of frequency regulation is critical, considering regulation is a key service for integrating variable renewable resources.\textsuperscript{173} As of this writing, the ISO/RTOs are at various stages of implementing Order No. 755.\textsuperscript{174}

\textit{ii. Frequency Regulation Outside the ISO/RTOs}

Order No. 755 does not apply outside of ISO/RTOs, where the transmission utilities retain operational control of the grid, and where there are no organized wholesale markets for ancillary services.\textsuperscript{175} Outside of ISO/RTOs, transmission utilities must ensure grid reliability, and thus an adequate provision of ancillary services. The procurement duty and cost of ancillary services falls on transmission customers (such as LSEs). One option for customers is to pay the transmission utility a regulated rate (stated in the OATT) for ancillary services. In that case, the transmission utility would either own and operate ancillary service resources, or procure such services through bilateral market-based agreements with third parties.\textsuperscript{176} Alternatively, customers can self-supply, either with their own ancillary service facilities, or bilateral agreements with third-parties.\textsuperscript{177}

To remedy barriers similar to those targeted in Order No. 755, FERC recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NOPR”) addressing ancillary service procurement and compensation outside of organized markets.\textsuperscript{178} Partly to eliminate barriers to storage where customers choose to self-supply regulation and frequency response outside of ISO/RTOs, the Commission proposed to require each public utility transmission provider to include provisions in its OATT explaining how it will determine regulation and frequency response service reserve requirements in a manner that takes into account the speed and accuracy of resources used.\textsuperscript{179} Transmission utilities generally state customers’ reserve requirements in simple quantities of capacity, i.e. MWs, without accounting for the performance characteristics of the resource providing frequency regulation or response. Consequently, if a customer chooses to self-supply (whether through ownership or third-party agreement), under prevailing requirements it would be

\textsuperscript{172} See KEMA, \textit{supra} note __, at 6.
\textsuperscript{173} See \textsc{Joseph H. Eto, et al.}, \textsc{Use of Frequency Response Metrics to Assess the Planning and Operating Requirements for Reliable Integration of Variable Renewable Generation}, at xvi (December 2010), \textit{available at} http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/reliability/frequencyresponsemetrics-report.pdf.
\textsuperscript{174} See \textsc{PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.}, 141 FERC ¶ 61134 (Nov. 16, 2012); \textsc{New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.}, 141 FERC ¶ 61105 (Nov. 6, 2012); \textsc{California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.}, 140 FERC ¶ 61206 (Sept. 20, 2012); \textsc{Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc.}, 140 FERC ¶ 61224 (Sept. 20, 2012); \textsc{PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.}, 139 FERC ¶ 61130 (May 17, 2012).
\textsuperscript{176} The latter option is in theory possible but in practice non-existent. See \textit{infra}, discussing \textsc{Avista}.
\textsuperscript{177} See, e.g., Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 at 31,716; \textit{pro forma} OATT, Original Sheet Nos. 20-21 and Schedule 3, Original Sheet No. 113.
\textsuperscript{178} See Storage NOPR, \textit{supra} note __.
\textsuperscript{179} See \textit{id.} at P49.
irrational to utilize a quick and accurate resource that is more cost-effective per amount of frequency regulation or response provided, if it is more expensive per MW of capacity. Thus, the Commission has preliminarily found that accounting for speed and accuracy in a public utility transmission provider’s determination of regulation and frequency response reserve requirements is necessary to address the potential for undue discrimination against customers choosing to self-supply their regulation and frequency response needs.\textsuperscript{180}

The NOPR also seeks to eliminate barriers to storage where a transmission utility decides to procure frequency regulation and response services through market-based agreements with third-parties, in satisfying the utility’s own duty to offer customers ancillary services at regulated rates through its OATT.\textsuperscript{181} In such circumstances, the Commission’s current policy requires a potential ancillary service provider to perform a market power study demonstrating a lack of market power for the particular ancillary service in the particular geographic market.\textsuperscript{182} However, partly because information required to perform the market power study is unavailable, the Commission has found that “the effect of the Avista policy is to categorically prohibit sales of ancillary services to public utility transmission providers outside of the RTO and ISO markets”.\textsuperscript{183}

The finer points of the Commission’s market power policy and its proposals for reforming the Avista policy are beyond the scope of this Article.\textsuperscript{184} Unlike other aspects of the NOPR, the Commission’s concern is not prompted directly by the novel operational characteristics of emerging storage technologies. Indeed, the Commission’s goal is to loosen Avista’s general stranglehold on

\textsuperscript{180} See id. 52.
\textsuperscript{181} See id. at P6. That is, the customer does not want to self-supply, thus it must pay the transmission utility for the ancillary services incident to its transmission service. The transmission utility must offer such services, and can do so either through owning and operating its own ancillary service resource, or through bilateral market-based agreements with third-parties. The current NOPR addresses the later situation.
\textsuperscript{182} See Avista Corp., 87 FERC ¶ 61,223 (Avista), order on reh’g, 89 FERC ¶ 61,136 (1999). The Commission must ensure that market-based rates are just and reasonable, primarily by ensuring that parties lack market power. In Avista, the Commission determined that requiring applicants for market-based rates in ancillary services to perform market power studies poses insurmountable barriers because the information needed to perform such studies is unavailable. Thus, the Commission permits a third-party supplier to sell ancillary services at market-based rates without showing a lack of market power in certain circumstances. For example, where selling ancillary services to transmission customers, the Commission reasoned that a third-party ancillary service provider would not be able to charge unjust or unreasonable rates because the customer could always fall back to the regulated OATT rates. However, the Commission did not exempt third parties offering ancillary services to a transmission utility. The Commission reasoned that “the public utility’s ability to recover such purchase costs in OATT rates might lead it to agree to above-market purchases, which would then be incorporated into the public utility’s OATT ancillary service rate and gradually increase that rate. This increase in turn would reduce the ability of the cost-based OATT rate to serve as an alternative to the third-party market based rate, and thus undermine the mitigation measure that the Commission relied upon in Avista to enable relaxation of the requirement for a market power analysis.” The NOPR revisits this policy, considering whether third party ancillary service providers should be more flexibly permitted to exercise market-based rate authority.
\textsuperscript{183} Storage NOPR, supra note __, at P11.
\textsuperscript{184} See id. at P13-46.
market-based ancillary service provision to transmission utilities, without regard
to the resource providing such services. However, lowered barriers to supplying
transmission utilities with ancillary services through market-based rates will open
opportunities for storage to the extent storage resources are cost-effective and the
utilities’ procurement decisions account for the inherently faster and more
accurate performance of certain storage technologies.\(^\text{185}\)

Indeed, among the most significant barriers to storage deployment is the limited opportunity to engage in
long-term service contracts with transmission utilities (because of the \textit{Avista}
policy). Without long-term contracts (or the ability to participate in capacity
markets, \textit{see infra}, section II.C.), storage projects cannot secure long-term
revenue streams, increasing investment risk and making it difficult to secure
financing for development and capital costs. Loosening the \textit{Avista} policy will
eliminate barriers to such long-term contracts, and thus facilitate storage resource
deployment.

3. \textit{Tertiary Frequency Control: Spinning and Non-Spinning Reserves}

Tertiary frequency control consists of manual changes in scheduled unit
commitment and dispatch levels in order to bring frequency back to ideal values
when secondary frequency control is unable to perform this task.\(^\text{186}\) The
ISO/RTOs use a variety of terms for tertiary ancillary services, but generally
speaking, there are two basic categories: spinning and non-spinning reserves.\(^\text{187}\)
To provide spinning reserve, a resource must be synchronized to the grid and
must be able to reach the declared output level within a short time interval: e.g.,
ten minutes for a ten-minute spinning reserve.\(^\text{188}\) In contrast, ten-minute non-

\(^{185}\) Because transmission utilities are required under the NOPR to account for the speed and
accuracy of frequency regulation and response resources in setting procurement requirements, and
under their OATT utilities must take transmission service on the same rates, terms, and conditions
as customers, once in compliance, utilities should be incentivized to prefer performance over mere
capacity to the extent such resources are cost-effective.

\(^{186}\) \textit{SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES, PROJECT REPORT: A SURVEY OF OPERATING RESERVE
MARKETS IN U.S. ISO/RTO-MANAGED ELECTRIC ENERGY REGIONS, AT 13 (September 2012),

\(^{187}\) \textit{See FERC, Preventing Undue Discrimination & Preference in Transmission Serv., 123
FERC ¶ 61299 (June 23, 2008) (pro forma OATT, Schedule 5-6). The seven energy regions also
provide for another category of reserve, less flexible than ten minute spinning and non-spinning
reserve, which is called “supplemental” by PJM, “replacement” by ERCOT, “operating” by ISO-NE,
and “30-minute” by NYISO. This reserve generally includes resources that are either
synchronized or non-synchronized to the grid and that can be brought up to the declared level of
output within thirty minutes. The purpose of this reserve is to restore the ten-minute spinning and
non-spinning reserve after a contingency has occurred. This frees up the spinning and non-spinning
generating units to again provide ten-minute spinning and non-spinning reserve, allowing
the system to be ready for a second contingency. One energy region, NYISO, formally divides its
30-minute reserve category into two sub-categories: namely, a 30- minute spinning reserve, and a
30-minute non-synchronized reserve. \textit{See SANDIA LABS, supra note __, at 16.}}

\(^{188}\) A spinning reserve is so-called because it is usually provided by a resource that is
synchronized with the grid and already running. For example, a CCGT plant running at half
capacity might be a spinning reserve. On the other hand, a non-spinning reserve is usually not
synchronized with the grid nor already running. For example, an oil generator capable of being
turned on and ramped up within ten minutes might provide non-spinning reserve service.
spinning reserve can be offered by an off-line resource, but it must be able to be synchronized to the grid and brought up to the declared output level within ten minutes. Spinning and non-spinning reserves provide frequency regulation in the event of a system contingency, like an unexpected loss of generation or transmission resources, but also provide load following reserves. Load following is the action of following the general trending load pattern within a day, and is usually performed by the economic dispatch of spinning reserve, but can also involve the dispatch of quick-start non-spinning reserves.  

Most of the ISO/RTOs require that a resource be able to provide continuous output for some specified duration of time in order to qualify as a reserve provider. For example, CAISO requires that spinning and/or non-spinning reserve resources be able to maintain a constant level of power output for a minimum of 30 minutes, whereas ISO-NE and MISO require such resources to be able to maintain a constant power output for a minimum of 60 minutes. Thus, certain storage resources should be able to participate in spinning and non-spinning reserve markets. However, most flywheels would not, because they usually can only discharge for about fifteen minutes at their rated capacity. 

Minimum duration requirements serve the operational need to manage medium- to longer-duration reserve requirements, and shorter duration products are more appropriately primary or secondary frequency control mechanisms. While flywheels are not ideal tertiary frequency control providers, other storage resources, including batteries and PSH, could perform as spinning or non-spinning reserves and as load following. Nonetheless, as with secondary frequency control markets, the ISO/RTOs do not adequately account for the valuable operational characteristics of storage resources. For example, spinning and non-spinning reserves are often defined as resources that can respond within ten minutes, a vestige of the operational characteristics of traditional load following resources like natural gas turbines. But storage is capable of near-instantaneous response and sustained discharge. Current market rules in tertiary frequency control markets—no less than in secondary—do not adequately account for or incentivize the performance characteristics of certain storage resources. Consequently, tertiary frequency control compensation mechanisms undervalue quick-response, rapid ramping, and accurate storage resources, resulting in unjust and unreasonable rates. Because storage resources are underincentivized, spinning and non-spinning reserve markets are inefficient, resulting in higher prices for consumers and a less reliable and more GHG-intensive power system.

C. Capacity Markets and Resource Adequacy Requirements

For much of the history of the electric power industry, vertically integrated utilities planned for and built generation resources, which were then incorporated into their rate base and paid for by ratepayers. Since the introduction of

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189 See SANDIA LABS, supra note __, at 16.
190 See id. at 18.
191 See supra, section I.C.
192 See supra, section II.A.
market-based rates and wholesale competition (not to mention retail competition), LSEs increasingly purchase energy from IPPs through wholesale markets or bilateral agreements. Consequently, utilities—especially those participating in organized wholesale markets—are less concerned with long-term planning needed to ensure that the development and maintenance of generation resources matches future load-side requirements. At the same time, revenue from energy and ancillary service sales is usually insufficient to cover the production costs, fixed O&M, and capital investments of new generation because the cost of wholesale power generally covers only the marginal, or variable, cost of generation. In short, in organized wholesale markets utilities have insufficient incentive to plan for long-term generation requirements, and energy and ancillary service revenues alone are inadequate to incentivize investment in new generation resources.

In response to this resource-planning deficit, certain organized wholesale markets have developed mechanisms to ensure the development and maintenance of generation resources by compensating for their fixed costs. These mechanisms are called by various names, but are typically called resource adequacy requirements, or when procured through a market, capacity markets. ISO/RTOs generally set installed capacity targets for a given period (for example, a one-year commitment period three years in advance) with locational variation depending on the load and transmission constraints of different zones. ISO/RTOs make capacity procurement the obligation of each utility or LSE. When a resource sells capacity, it commits to reserve that amount of generating capacity during a commitment period, in the event the resource is needed to satisfy demand.

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193 About one third of all power consumed in the United States is generated by IPPs. See EIA, Electric Power Annual 2011, at Table 1.3 (January 2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/epa.pdf.
195 The ISO/RTOs with capacity markets include NYISO, ISO-NE, PJM, and MISO. CAISO is considering a capacity market but has not instituted one. See CAISO, Capacity Markets, at http://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/StakeholderProcesses/CompletedStakeholderProcesses/CapacityMarkets.aspx.
196 Capacity markets are critical for incentivizing efficient market entrants. A prospective investor estimates the cost of investment over the life of a project minus the expected variable profits from providing energy and ancillary services (after netting the associated variable costs). This difference between investment costs and variable profits, which is known as Net Cost of New Entry (“Net CONE”), is the estimated capacity revenue that would be necessary for the investment to be profitable. In an efficient market, the investments with the lowest Net CONE will be the first to occur. See David B. Patton, et al., 2011 Assessment of the ISO New England Electricity Markets, at 106–7 (2012), available at http://www.iso-ne.com/markets/mktmonmit/rpts/ind_mkt_advst/emm_mrktsrpt.pdf.
In particular, capacity payments provide a significant stream of revenue that contributes to the recovery of total costs for new and existing peaking units. Peaking units dispatch only during certain periods of high demand, with capacity factors on average around 8-10%.

Their high marginal costs command high energy prices when dispatched (and, indeed, usually set the clearing price during peak periods), but revenue from energy alone is generally insufficient to cover the total costs of peaking resources. Thus, peaking plants rely heavily on capacity revenues to cover fixed costs. The capacity market is also a significant source of net revenue to cover the fixed costs of investing in new intermediate and base load units, but capacity revenues are a larger part of net revenue for peaking units.

For example, for the year 2012, PJM estimated that a hypothetical gas turbine running as a peaking resource might have net energy revenues of $23,240 and net capacity revenues of $30,116. Thus, capacity constituted 55% of net revenues for a gas turbine peaking facility. On the other hand, PJM estimated that a hypothetical CCGT (likely running as an intermediate or baseload resource) would have net energy revenues of $97,260, and net capacity revenues of $31,422, or 24% capacity payments as a share of net revenues. Indeed, overall, capacity payments constitute the second greatest component of PJM’s overall wholesale costs—about 18% in 2010.

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201 Id.
Advanced storage technologies are well suited to ensure resource adequacy by functioning as peaking capacity (by shifting low-cost, off-peak energy to meet high-cost peak load). But storage resources are not permitted to participate in most resource adequacy planning, even though they satisfy the basic criteria of a capacity resource. As a matter of policy rather than operational rationale, most of the RTOs/ISOs prohibit storage from participating in capacity markets and resource adequacy planning. Thus, storage resources are generally limited to revenue from ancillary service and—for longer-duration, energy-intensive devices—energy markets. In other ISO/RTOs without organized capacity markets, LSEs must satisfy capacity reserve margins through bilateral agreements or self-supplying, but similarly, those ISO/RTOs do not permit LSEs to satisfy their capacity requirements with storage capacity. Storage resources

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203 NYISO is one of the few ISO/RTOs that permit storage to participate in a capacity market. However, NYISO permits an “Energy Limited Resource” to participate only if it can offer capacity for a minimum of four hours. See NYISO, Installed Capacity Manual (February 2013), at 4.8.2, available at http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/market_data/icap/Manuas_and_Forms /ICAP_Manual/icap_rnl.aspx. Requiring a minimum four-hour commitment prevents many storage resources from accessing capacity payments, including all flywheels and many batteries.
thus have no mechanism for recouping their total costs, a significant barrier for any resource, but especially for emerging technologies with slim margins.\textsuperscript{204}

\textbf{D. Some Classification Problems}

“[E]lectricity storage devices . . . do not readily fit into only one of the traditional asset functions of generation, transmission or distribution. Under certain circumstances, storage devices can resemble any of these functions or even load.”\textsuperscript{205} However, the nature of the Commission’s jurisdiction often hinges on the classification of a resource. Without an established policy for classifying storage, or knowing how to maximize storage asset revenue and value streams, regulatory uncertainty inhibits investment by market actors and regulated utilities alike. To date, the Commission has been hesitant, only “address[ing] the classification of energy storage devices on a case-by-case basis”.\textsuperscript{206}

One issue is whether a storage device deployed on the bulk grid constitutes a transmission or generation asset. In a matter of first impression, the Commission had little difficulty granting “exempt wholesale generator” status to a 20MW battery system intended to provide frequency regulation at market-based rates in NYISO’s competitive wholesale market.\textsuperscript{207} In classifying the project, the Commission looked primarily to the applicant’s intended use—exclusively providing ancillary services.\textsuperscript{208} Indeed, from an operational perspective, the “generation” bucket is perhaps the most comfortable fit for storage resources intended to perform energy and ancillary service functions,\textsuperscript{209} especially in an organized market.\textsuperscript{210}

The Commission has also contemplated that storage resources might constitute generation facilities in the context of two recent rulemakings. Most recently, FERC issued a NOPR proposing changes to the Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures (“SGIA” and “SGIP”), to among other things, permit more small generators—particularly distributed solar PV—to use the “Fast Track Process”, which reduces the cost, time, and regulatory burden of interconnecting with utility grids.\textsuperscript{211} The NOPR states that Commission Staff

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{204}DOE, \textit{National Assessment of Energy Storage for Grid Balancing and Arbitrage: Phase I}, WECC, at xii (June 2012) (noting that storage will require additional revenue streams such as capacity payments to be viable), \textit{available at } http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL-21388_National_Assessment_Storage_Phase_1_final.pdf
\item \textsuperscript{205}W. Grid Dev., LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61056, at P44 (Jan. 21, 2010) (“Western Grid”).
\item \textsuperscript{206}Id.
\item \textsuperscript{207}AES ES Westover, LLC, 131 FERC ¶ 61008 (Apr. 5, 2010) (“We note that this is the first instance in which the owner of a battery storage facility has sought EWG status.”).
\item \textsuperscript{208}Id. at P7 (“Applicant has represented that it will operate the *61044 Facility in such a manner that it will be engaged directly and exclusively in selling electric energy at wholesale.”).
\item \textsuperscript{209}See, e.g., Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C., 95 FERC ¶ 61476 (June 29, 2001) (ruling that energy exchange transactions for charging/discharging the first merchant CAES generator in the United States were wholesale transactions under the FPA subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission).
\item \textsuperscript{210}See AES ES Westover, LLC, 131 FERC ¶ 61008.
\item \textsuperscript{211}See Small Generator Interconnection Agreements & Procedures, 142 FERC ¶ 61049 (Jan. 17, 2013)
\end{itemize}
plans to hold a technical conference, at which Staff and stakeholders will discuss “[w]hether storage devices could fall within the definition of Small Generating Facility included in . . . the SGIP . . . SGIA as devices that produce electricity”.212 The Commission appears inclined to target interconnection barriers to small storage resources, while indicating an inclination to consider storage as a generation resource in this context (i.e. “devices that produce electricity”).

Separately, the Commission also discussed the possible application to storage of Order No. 764, which promotes the integration of variable energy resources (“VERs”) by requiring each public utility transmission provider to offer intra-hourly (fifteen-minute) transmission scheduling.213 While primarily intended to eliminate barriers to wind and solar resources,214 the Commission emphasized that “many types of entities, not only VERs, may benefit from the availability of intra-hour scheduling . . . . This includes, for example, . . . transmission customers taking delivery from energy constrained resources (such as flow-limited hydro-electric generators . . . and energy storage resources)”.215 Again, in the context of a rulemaking for certain types of generation resources, the Commission indicated that energy storage might constitute a generation resource benefited by the rule.

On the other hand, FERC seems less inclined to consider a storage device as a transmission asset, particularly for the purposes of granting cost-of-service rate treatment. Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, the Commission has found that storage devices may constitute transmission facilities. FERC faced this question in Western Grid Development, LLC, where a CAISO Participating Transmission Owner (“PTO”)216 proposed a series of sodium sulfur batteries ranging in size from 10MW to 50MW. The PTO stated the batteries would “provide transmission services to solve existing reliability problems [on the CAISO grid] at a lower cost than traditional transmission upgrades”217 Contingent on CAISO’s approval of the projects through its own transmission planning process,218 and “based on the specific circumstances and characteristics” of the proposal, the Commission found the projects were “wholesale transmission facilities” subject to its jurisdiction.219 The Commission emphasized the storage

212 Id. at 48(e).
213 Integration of Variable Energy Res., 139 FERC ¶ 61246 (June 22, 2012).
214 “Implementation of intra-hour scheduling under this Final Rule will provide VERs and other transmission customers the flexibility to adjust their transmission schedules, thus limiting their exposure to imbalance charges.” Id.
215 Id. at P94.
216 A Participating Transmission Owner is a transmission owner who agrees to place its facilities under the operational control of an ISO/RTO. The owner has no operational discretion (though may retain actual control), but receives the regulated rates paid for transmission service by customers.
217 Id. at P3-4. Western Grid claimed that the Projects would facilitate reliability on the CAISO system by (1) mitigating normal transmission overload; (2) addressing transmission line trips; (3) responding to transmission lines taken off for maintenance; and/or (4) reacting to voltage dips on transmission line segments on the CAISO system.
218 Notably, CAISO strongly opposed the projects.
219 Id. at P43. The Commission, further emphasizing the exceptionality of its finding, stated: “Western Grid has put forth a proposal that is unique thus far in terms of how it utilizes storage
resources would function analogously to other transmission assets, such as “capacitors that address voltage issues or alternate transmission circuits that address line overloads or trips.” The Commission rejected the objection that unlike capacitors, which are passive grid components, batteries are dispatchable and thus, in effect, behave at times like generators. The Commission also emphasized that Western Grid would not retain any incidental net revenue from the purchase and sale of energy, thus distinguishing the projects from generation assets used for providing energy or ancillary services. Finally, the Commission emphasized that CAISO would exercise total operational control over the storage devices, similar to normal transmission facilities. Ultimately, the Commission hedged its decision as “unique”, but indicated an openness to classifying storage resources based not on dogma, but rather a careful and open-minded consideration of the project’s intended uses and capabilities.

Earlier, the Commission refused to grant an advanced PSH project cost-of-service recovery as a transmission facility, in what it called at the time an “issue[] of first impression.” The applicant requested cost-of-service rate treatment for a high-voltage transmission line and PSH project (the Lake Elsinore Advance Pump Storage project (“LEAPS”)), which were intended to “help the [CAISO] manage grid operations, shift off-peak energy closer to the demand center during peak periods, and enhance the reliability of the Southern California transmission grid while helping the State of California achieve its renewable resource use goals”. Importantly, the Commission agreed with Nevada Hydro that the project, a PSH project, qualified as an “advanced transmission technology” under the EPAct of 2005. Going one step further, the Commission seemed to interpret EPAct of 2005 as evidencing Congressional support for classifying “advanced transmission technology” as FERC-jurisdictional transmission technology to mimic a wholesale transmission function. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the specific way in which the Projects’ NaS batteries will be operated and Western Grid's proposed cost recovery methodology. Our finding here that this particular project is transmission is limited to the facts presented by Western Grid in this proceeding.”

220 Id. At 45.
221 Id.
222 Id. At 46.
223 Accord Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting & Fin. Reporting for New Elec. Storage Technologies, 135 FERC ¶ 61240 (June 16, 2011) (“When faced with various proposals to use energy storage technologies for jurisdictional purposes, the Commission has analyzed the intended use and capability of storage proposals on a case-by-case basis.”).
224 See The Nevada Hydro Co., Inc., 117 FERC ¶ 61204 (Nov. 17, 2006) (“Nevada Hydro I”).
225 Id.
Nonetheless, the Commission refused to grant the project regulated cost recovery through the CAISO’s transmission rates. In *Nevada Hydro*, the Commission suggested a distinction between older PSH technologies on the one hand, and smaller, more nimble advanced storage technologies on the other hand. Among other concerns, the Commission noted that all of the PSH within the CAISO footprint provide generation services, and none receives the benefit of rolled-in transmission pricing. The Commission concluded “that allowing LEAPS to receive a guaranteed revenue stream through CAISO’s [transmission tariff] would create an undue preference for LEAPS compared to these other similarly situated pumped hydro generators.” In a more recent issuance, the Commission noted that “[w]hile the Commission has no basis to believe it is impossible to use large-scale pumped storage technologies to perform transmission or distribution functions as well, to date, no pumped storage developer has successfully demonstrated such a non-‘production’ use to the Commission. This stands in contrast to the track record for smaller-scale energy storage technologies, where one battery developer has successfully supported a non-production, transmission use for its project.” Thus, newer storage technologies, which are bound by no comparable precedent, and smaller facilities, which have less capability to behave like a generator and more capability to perform flexible “non-‘production’” functions, may be more likely to receive approval as FERC-jurisdictional transmission facilities subject to a cost-of-service rate.

Perhaps equally important in *Nevada Hydro*, however, was the Commission’s apparent discomfort with an ISO/RTO taking operational control over a facility capable of behaving at times like a large (500MW) generator. As in *Western Grid*, the applicant proposed to turn over operational control of the project to CAISO. But the Commission, CAISO, and a number of interveners objected that CAISO’s operational control over LEAPS, and in particular its decisionmaking authority over when to charge and discharge the facility, would compromise its independence from market participants (required under Order No. 2000), render the ISO a “de facto market participant”, and distort market prices. Nevada Hydro argued that every CAISO operational decision affects market prices, including decisions to dispatch real power from Reliability Must-Run (“RMR”) units. Indeed, because RMRs do not clear in the market, and are dispatched and compensated directly by the ISO/RTO, an RMR is functionally a generator under an ISO/RTO’s operational control. However, in *Western Grid*, the Commission distinguished Nevada Hydro on the simple basis that Western

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227 The Commission also found the proposed batteries in Western Grid to qualify as “advanced transmission technologies”, but did not cite that finding in concluding the projects were FERC-jurisdictional transmission facilities.
229 See id.
230 Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting & Fin. Reporting for New Elec. Storage Technologies, 139 FERC ¶ 61245 (June 22, 2012) (citing Western Grid, supra note __).
231 See Nevada Hydro II, supra note __.
232 Id.
233 An RMR unit is a facility the ISO may call upon to run when required for grid reliability.
Grid would retain responsibility for maintaining the state of charge, including the cost of charging, and it would return any net revenues to its customers.\textsuperscript{234} Thus, in Western Grid (and as with RMRs), CAISO had no incentive to become a profit-seeking market participant. But in Nevada Hydro, the Commission also seemed intent on deferring to the outcome of a Commission-ordered CAISO stakeholder process, which, on an “extensive record”, concluded that it would be inappropriate for CAISO to take operational control of LEAPS.\textsuperscript{235} After Western Grid and Nevada Hydro, it is ultimately unclear in what circumstances an ISO/RTO may exercise operational control of a storage resource. ISO/RTOs presented with the opportunity are unlikely to embrace it, and participating transmission owners are unlikely to themselves propose a storage device in lieu of traditional transmission infrastructure without further clarification. The Commission has provided little guidance.\textsuperscript{236}

In Western Grid, there was no question that the proposed storage projects related to wholesale power and thus that their rates were within FERC’s jurisdiction; the question was whether the storage devices at issue were transmission or generation assets, a pivotal question in determining the Commission’s jurisdiction and the available means of cost recovery. Another unresolved issue is how to distinguish between transmission and distribution facilities. An example might be CES functioning exclusively to provide distribution-side power quality, voltage control, and emergency energy services. In a jurisdiction with bundled retail rates, the state would have exclusive jurisdiction over such resources and related rates, terms, and conditions of service.\textsuperscript{237} In a jurisdiction with unbundled retail rates, however, the Commission exercises jurisdiction over retail transmission facilities (and related rates, terms, and conditions), but not purely local distribution facilities.\textsuperscript{238} The question is thus whether CES resources performing distribution-side services constitute local distribution facilities outside FERC’s jurisdiction. The Commission distinguishes between retail distribution and transmission facilities with a seven-part test established in Order No. 888. The seven indicia of local distribution facilities are as follows.

\textsuperscript{234} Western Grid, supra note __.

\textsuperscript{235} The Commission noted, “CAISO submits that, based on stakeholder input and its own evaluation of the issues, recovery of the LEAPS facility through CAISO’s [transmission rate] should not be permitted and CAISO should not assume operational control of the LEAPS facility, other than its normal role with respect to the operation of generating units. Thus, CAISO recommends market recovery for the LEAPS facility, pursuant to the Large Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP) in the CAISO Tariff.” Nevada Hydro II, supra note __.

\textsuperscript{236} See, e.g., Tres Amigas LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61207 (Mar. 18, 2010) (In approving a merchant transmission line, the Commission emphasized that it was not approving related storage projects, and noted uncertainty as to “whether any battery storage facilities are transmission assets subject to the negotiated rate authority granted in this order”).

\textsuperscript{237} See New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 26 (2002) (affirming FERC’s decision in Order No. 888 to not assert jurisdiction over the transmission of bundled retail services).

\textsuperscript{238} See Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (distinguishing between state and FERC authority based on whether the transaction is a local unbundled sale or an interstate transmission).
1. Local distribution facilities are normally in close proximity to retail customers.
2. Local distribution facilities are primarily radial in character.
3. Power flows into local distribution systems; it rarely, if ever, flows out.
4. When power enters a local distribution system, it is not reconsigned or transported on to some other market.
5. Power entering a local distribution system is consumed in a comparatively restricted geographical area.
6. Meters are based at the transmission/local distribution interface to measure flows into the local distribution system.
7. Local distribution systems will be of reduced voltage.

The Commission “will defer to recommendations by state regulatory authorities concerning where to draw the jurisdictional line under [the seven-part test] for local distribution facilities, and how to allocate costs for such facilities to be included in rates.”

Considering the Order No. 888 factors, the hypothesized CES facility fits more comfortably on the local distributional side, beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction. Certainly, the Commission would defer to a well-reasoned state regulator’s determination that such CES were state-jurisdictional. But what if the very same facilities, providing unbundled, local distribution services, also sold ancillary services in an organized wholesale market? In that case, FERC would exercise jurisdiction over the ancillary service sales, and the CES would, in effect, become both a distribution and generation resource. But dividing the storage device into different functional assets—one rate-regulated, the other rate-unregulated; one state-regulated, the other FERC-regulated—raises a new set of currently unresolved classification problems.

Combining Western Grid/Nevada Hydro and the above CES example, it is apparent that not only might the Commission classify a given storage device as a distribution, transmission, or generation asset, a storage device might properly be classified as more than one. Legacy technologies do not pose the energy storage classification conundrum, partly because they are operationally less flexible, and partly because the classifications themselves arise from and are tailored to traditional resources. But maximizing the value of a given storage asset within the traditional generation-transmission-distribution framework may require

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239 Order 888.
240 Id.
241 See A123, Comments in AD10-13-000, at 11 (August 29, 2010) (“If placed at a distribution site, the [CES] itself would meet some of the seven-factor criteria, including factors (1) close proximity to retail customers, (2) primarily radial, and (7) relatively reduced voltage. The voltage support service would satisfy the remaining four factors. However, the regulation service would be inconsistent with factors (3) unidirectional flow, (4) energy not transported to another market, (5) energy consumption in a restricted geographic area, and (6) meters used to measure flows into the distribution system. In fact, the regulation capability would utilize bidirectional flows, the energy would be readily transportable to another market for consumption, and the meters would measure upstream flows to the transmission system.”)

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classifying it in more than one asset category. For example, a transmission utility might deploy a 50MW battery as a transmission asset performing routine ancillary grid functions, and recover its costs under a FERC-approved cost-of-service rate stated in its OATT. But the utility might also deploy the battery to sell wholesale energy at market-based rates during peak demand, perhaps shifting excess renewable generation from off-peak hours. The problem posed is that the utility would receive a guaranteed rate of return on the battery through its cost-of-service transmission rate, and simultaneously receive market-based revenues from selling wholesale energy. A different version of the same problem is implicated in the CES example, above, where a distribution utility receives regulated retail rates and simultaneously bids ancillary services into wholesale markets. In both instances, because the storage device is subsidized by its guaranteed cost-of-service rates, the utility could offer its services at below-market wholesale prices, affording it an unfair advantage and distorting market signals. Likewise, if the utility is also selling energy in an unbundled, competitive retail market, its wholesale revenues could subsidize its retail rates and affect competition on the retail level. In both instances, the device would over-recover its costs. The utility would ultimately over-recover its costs by combining regulated and market-based revenues.

FERC is rightly wary of such “cross-subsidization” or “double recovery,” but has provided little guidance as to how an storage asset might maximize its value through flexible, multifaceted deployment. The Commission has permitted a single project or physical asset to receive revenues from both regulated and market-based sources when the device was functionally divided by ownership. For example, in Linden VFT, a developer installed new cooling equipment to increase the thermal capacity of an existing regulated line by 300MW. The Commission permitted Linden to operate the incremental capacity as a merchant transmission project while the original capacity, under separate ownership, remained under regulated rates. However, in Linden VFT, the distinction between the old and new assets—i.e., that each rate type was hooked onto a distinct set of assets—seemed critical. What about a single battery system, the entire capacity of which is sometimes performing transmission functions under a cost-of-service rate, and sometimes performing generation functions at market-based rates? In this regard, FERC precedent provides only limited guidance, leaving significant regulatory uncertainty and inhibiting storage adoption by regulated transmission-owning entities.

Taking its first step toward resolving the classification problem in a rulemaking context, the Commission recently issued a NOPR (bundled with the NOPR discussed above) to revise the accounting and reporting requirements for FERC-jurisdictional entities, to better account for and report transactions

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243 Linden VFT, LLC, 119 FERC ¶ 61,066 (April 19, 2007), order on rehearing 120 FERC ¶ 61,242 (September 20, 2007).
244 Id.
associated with the use of energy storage devices in public utility operations.\textsuperscript{245} The NOPR recognizes that “entities using energy storage assets may seek multiple methods of cost recovery for their investments in and use of a single energy storage asset to provide various utility services”, and thus, in theory, “a public utility could simultaneously recover costs under both cost-based and market-based rates”.\textsuperscript{246} To accommodate the multiple functions and value streams of storage resources, and ensure “transparent information on the activities and costs of new energy storage operations”, the Commission proposes relatively simple revisions to its Uniform System of Accounts. In short, the Commission proposes to add new storage-specific expense accounts to existing functional classifications.\textsuperscript{247} The Commission’s NOPR is much needed, and affords a balance between transparency and flexibility, requiring public utilities to account for storage-specific financial and operational information, while also affording flexibility in classifying such costs. However, and importantly, the Commission acknowledges the limited effect of the NOPR, when it states that the “Commission’s accounting and reporting requirements . . . do not dictate the ratemaking decisions of this Commission or State Commissions”; they are merely intended to “support the rate oversight needs of both this Commission and State Commissions”.\textsuperscript{248}

In its recent NOPR, the Commission proposes useful revisions to its accounting requirements, but punts on the question of how the Commission itself will classify storage if and when it faces future cost-of-service, or yet more difficult, hybrid cost-of-service/market-based rate proposals for storage resources. The lack of clarity as to how a storage device might be categorized inhibits regulated utilities from considering storage in making investment and planning decisions.\textsuperscript{249} Indeed, utilities are extremely conservative investors. Without clarity—and with a guaranteed rate of return for doing business as usual—transmission utilities have no incentive to consider new technologies laced with regulatory uncertainties. The NOPR’s modest ambitions stand in sharp relief to the comprehensive inquiries launched in the Request for Comments that initiated the current NOPR.\textsuperscript{250} Perhaps the Commission continues to formulate next steps,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{245} See Storage NOPR, supra note __.
\item \textsuperscript{246} Id. at P55, 67.
\item \textsuperscript{247} Id. at P68. The Commission rejected the suggestion of some commenters to create an entirely new and independent functional class for energy storage, reasoning that it “is unnecessary because the existing functional classifications can adequately support energy storage operations”. Id. at P70.
\item \textsuperscript{248} Id. Among other things, the Commission did note that “[t]ransparency improvements achieved through revisions to the existing accounting and reporting requirements . . . will enable the Commission and others to better monitor for cross-subsidization”, but again, the Commission provided no guidance as to whether it would actually permit partitioning of assets or multiple cost recovery mechanisms.
\item \textsuperscript{249} For example, the Commission notes in the NOPR that it “has not to date received any proposals from public utilities that simultaneously seek to recover costs under cost-based and market-based rate mechanisms using a single energy storage asset, but the Commission remains open to innovative solutions and will evaluate proposals on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at note 90.
\item \textsuperscript{250} See Request for Comments Regarding Rates, Accounting and Financial Reporting for New Electric Storage Technologies, Docket No. AD10-13-000, 75 FR 36381 (June 25, 2010).
\end{itemize}
but in the meantime, the Commission’s reluctance to resolve these questions, even in the context of a generalized Request for Comments, is unfortunate, and leaves significant barriers to energy storage in public utility transmission development.

E. Transmission Planning

Although significant uncertainty remains as to how the Commission will classify any given storage deployment, the Commission has in certain circumstances classified storage as a jurisdictional transmission facility. Indeed, Congress has instructed the Commission that “[i]n carrying out the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C. 791a et seq.) and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.), the Commission shall encourage, as appropriate, the deployment of advanced transmission technologies”.251 “The term ‘advanced transmission technology’ means a technology that increases the capacity, efficiency, or reliability of an existing or new transmission facility, including— . . . (11) energy storage devices (including pumped hydro, compressed air, superconducting magnetic energy storage, flywheels, and batteries)”.252 In Western Grid and Nevada Hydro, the Commission did not interpret EPAct of 2005 as requiring it to either (A) categorize storage as “transmission” assets, or (B) “encourage” every storage proposal by approving storage transmission projects in all circumstances.253 The Commission rightly emphasized that Congress gave it discretion to “encourage, as appropriate, the deployment” of storage resources (and other advanced transmission technologies), and did not foreclose classification of storage as non-transmission in appropriate circumstances.254 Nonetheless, Congressional intent and FERC precedent suggest that storage will increasingly be utilized as transmission facilities, thus raising questions as to how it will fit into FERC’s transmission planning policies.

Partly implementing Congress’ mandate to encourage advanced transmission technologies like storage, FERC has adopted incentive rates to promote investment in certain transmission projects. EPAct of 2005, which added a new section 219 to the FPA, instructs FERC to “provide a return on equity that attracts new investment in transmission facilities (including related transmission technologies); [and] (3) encourage deployment of transmission technologies and other measures to increase the capacity and efficiency of existing transmission facilities and improve the operation of the facilities.”255 The Commission has implemented this mandate through Order No. 679.256 Order No. 679 established a “nexus test”, which requires incentive applicants to demonstrate a connection between the incentive(s) requested under Order No. 679 and the proposed investment, and that the incentive(s) requested address the risks and challenges

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251 42 U.S.C.A. § 16422(b)
252 42 U.S.C.A. § 16422(a).
253 See Western Grid, supra note __; Nevada Hydro II, supra note __; Nevada Hydro I, supra note __.
254 See Nevada Hydro II, supra note __, at P84.
255 16 U.S.C. 824s.
In considering the use of advanced transmission technologies, the Commission will, "as part of the overall nexus analysis, account[] for the risks and challenges associated with utilizing such advanced technology". In considering the use of advanced transmission technologies, the Commission will, "as part of the overall nexus analysis, account[] for the risks and challenges associated with utilizing such advanced technology".258

Order No. 679 appears to have influenced regulated transmission investment.259 The year before Order No. 679 was promulgated, total regulated transmission investment in 2010 inflation-adjusted dollars totaled $6.5 billion; for the years 2006-2010, annual investment averaged $9.3 billion, which amounts to an increase of over 42 percent.260 Although uncommon, the Commission appears willing to consider and approve (generous) incentives for storage resources applying for regulated rates.261 Moreover, a major criticism of Order No. 679 is that it has been too loosely implemented, offering incentives to too many transmission projects.262 FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, for example, has emphasized that incentives “should be more narrowly targeted to transmission investments that provide incremental benefits, such as those that result from the deployment of ‘best available technologies’ that increase operational and energy efficiency, enhance grid operations, and result in greater grid flexibility.”263 As the Commission tightens its Order No. 679-purse, it may be more likely to focus incentives on advanced transmission technologies, including energy storage projects.

FERC has also exercised significant influence over the way transmission utilities plan transmission system development. In July 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000, the latest in a series of orders intended to improve federal transmission access, planning, and coordination.265 FERC explained in Order No. 1000 that

257 Promoting Transmission Inv. Through Pricing Reform, 141 FERC ¶ 61129 (Nov. 15, 2012). In this policy statement issued in November, 2012, the Commission reformed the “nexus test”, eliminating a test based on whether the proposed project was “routine” or “non-routine”. The Commission also eliminated its practice of awarding a stand-alone return-on-equity (ROE) incentive based simply on the utilization of an advanced technology. See id. at P23.

258 Id.

259 Incentives under Order 679 only apply to regulated transmission projects (i.e. those receiving cost-of-service compensation), not market-based projects.


261 See Western Grid, supra note __ (generously offering advanced battery storage (1) inclusion of 100 percent of construction work in progress in rate base; (2) combined rates of return on equity adders of as high as 195 basis points; (3) deferred cost recovery through creation of a regulatory asset for pre-commercial costs; and (4) a hypothetical capital structure of 50 percent equity and 50 percent debt).

262 For example, Former Commissioner Suedeen Kelly once stated that “granting incentives requests for routine projects . . . solidifies incentive rate making as the new normal.” PEPCO Holdings, Dkt. ER08-686, 124 FERC ¶61, 176 (Aug. 22, 2008, dissenting opinion).

263 Nevada Hydro II, supra note __ (Wellinghoff, Commissioner, concurring in part).


over the last few decades, and especially in recent years, federal and state policies have significantly affected the generation mix and, subsequently, future transmission needs—in particular, policies promoting development of renewable generation. As FERC acknowledged, its existing orders regarding transmission did not provide regional planners adequate direction as to how to consider these reforms.266 Addressing these issues, Order No. 1000 affirmatively requires all public utility transmission providers to participate in a regional planning process that satisfies the requirements set out in Order No. 890, and produce a regional transmission plan.267 Among other requirements, the planning process must (1) consider transmission needs driven by “public policy requirements”, and (2) give non-transmission and transmission alternatives comparable consideration.268

FERC demurred when asked to cite specific “public policy requirements” that must be considered, and on rehearing explained that planning must incorporate currently enacted “state or federal laws or regulations that drive transmission needs”.269 But the unspoken focus is state and federal policies, primarily Renewable Portfolio Standards (“RPSs”) and federal incentives, that have fueled the development of renewable generation resources, especially wind and solar.270 As we know, wind and solar are variable. But renewables are not only temporally inconvenient; renewable resources (strong wind, bright sun) are also usually located far from load centers and existing transmission infrastructure.271 Thus, integrating the expanding fleet of renewable generation that state and federal public policy requirements have encouraged will require substantial new transmission infrastructure.272 As discussed above, storage can perform a variety of transmission functions, including functions that facilitate renewables integration. Moreover, energy storage is itself a public policy priority in some regions, most notably California.273 However, Order No. 1000 does not mention storage, and the Commission’s compliance orders to date do not indicate any intention to require regional planning consider how storage resources might


266 Id. at P31.
267 Id. at P6.
268 Id. at PP6, 203-16.
270 See, e.g., Order No. 1000, supra note __, at P 29 (“Much of this investment in renewable generation is being driven by renewable portfolio standards adopted by states. Some 28 states and the District of Columbia have now adopted renewable portfolio standard measures.”).
272 Order No. 1000 notes that in its 2010 Long-Term Reliability Assessment, NERC identifies 39,000 circuit-miles of projected new high-voltage transmission over the next 10 years. NERC estimates that roughly a third of these transmission facilities will be needed to integrate variable and renewable generation. See Order No. 1000, supra note __, at P29.
273 See supra note __ [re CA], and accompanying text.
address transmission-related public policy requirements, and/or require consideration of storage as public policy priorities.

A second important contribution of Order No. 1000 is to require “comparable consideration” during the planning process of transmission and non-transmission alternatives for meeting identified regional transmission needs. By requiring this comparable treatment, Order No. 1000 recognizes the important fact that even once a potential transmission need is identified, a new line is not always the best way to meet that need. Such “non-wires” solutions may be at once more cost-effective and more socially desirable. For example, demand response and energy efficiency are possible non-transmission alternatives because in some circumstances they may obviate the need for new transmission lines altogether. Likewise, storage performing ancillary services or alleviating congestion could be a cost-effective and prudent alternative to new transmission lines. But the Commission did not indicate in Order No. 1000, nor in any of the compliance filings to date, any indication whether storage should be considered as a non-transmission alternative, and none of the public utility filings have indicated whether regional planning processes have considered storage as non-transmission alternatives.

Thus, notwithstanding the bold promise of Order No. 1000, storage does not appear to be a priority in regional transmission planning that the Commission will require transmission planners to consider, whether as the solution to a transmission need driven by public policy, or as a non-transmission alternative to an identified transmission need.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FERC: COMPARABILITY AND CLARITY

In short, the problem of energy storage is one of regulatory adaptation to technological change. Advanced storage is a disruptive technology, which not only challenges basic market and industry paradigms, but also confounds regulatory categories and market rules developed for legacy systems. FERC, as regulator, must proactively ensure that markets adapt to new technologies. The focus should not be on technologies per se, but rather operational characteristics. Where an emerging technology performs a function differently than existing


technologies, or where it performs an entirely novel type of function, regulatory categories and market rules may underincentivize, inhibit, or entirely preclude its adoption. Such barriers, rooted as they are in the historical characteristics of legacy systems, are unduly discriminatory against new technologies. Moreover, because antiquated rules prevent the efficiency gains afforded by new technologies, wholesale rates are consequently neither just nor reasonable, and consumer rates are higher than necessary. FERC should take the following actions to ensure comparable consideration of storage alongside traditional resources, and clarify the Commission’s approach to classifying storage assets.

A. Remediying Discrimination in the Provision of Ancillary Services

FERC has successfully remedied undue discrimination in organized markets for frequency regulation, and should finalize its proposed rule for ensuring that transmission utilities consider the speed and accuracy of regulation resources in setting procurement requirements.\(^{277}\) It must also finalize its proposal to reform the *Avista* policy and thereby eliminate a categorical barrier to third-party provision of ancillary services outside of ISO/RTOs.\(^{278}\) Finally, it must ensure those orders are effectively implemented. However, the Commission’s decision to remedy undue discrimination in ancillary service markets piecemeal has left intact the preferential treatment for incumbent resources in the provision of other ancillary services. Perhaps justifiably, the Commission has decided to progress with caution. But the very same principles that animate its orders relating to frequency regulation are equally applicable to primary and tertiary frequency control and other reserve products—eventually, the Commission must address remaining barriers to energy storage in the provision of other ancillary services.

Primary frequency control reserve is provided by all resources with autonomous governor response that are synchronized (and have the headroom to increase generation), but none of the ISO/RTOs procure frequency response through organized markets. FERC has not historically required the creation of organized wholesale markets for wholesale products, but rather has ensured that once established, such markets are governed by just, reasonable, nondiscriminatory rules. As the amount of power provided by variable renewable generation increases, the fraction of on-line generation capacity offering primary frequency control will decrease—in the future, market mechanisms may be necessary to ensure sufficient provision of primary frequency control reserve.\(^{279}\) Regardless of whether FERC should mandate the creation of frequency response markets, or whether the ISO/RTOs independently conclude that such markets are necessary, FERC must ensure that rules for the provision of frequency response are not unduly discriminatory or preferential if and when such markets are created. Likewise, if and when primary frequency response becomes an

\(^{277}\) See supra, Section II.B.2.

\(^{278}\) See id.


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unbundled service outside of ISO/RTOs, the Commission must ensure that procurement targets and compensation practices account for actual performance, to ensure just and reasonable treatment of storage resources.

Perhaps more immediately, FERC must remedy undue discrimination in the provision of spinning and non-spinning reserves. Once discharging, conventional generators and storage resources have comparable operational characteristics in providing tertiary frequency control. However, the spinning and non-spinning reserve products in ISO/RTOs do not reward, or even consider the possibility of, a resource capable of ramping to a substantial output within instants of system need. Quite simply, current market rules are tailored to the operational characteristics of traditional resources. The rules assume that quick reserve resources will take ten minutes to ramp up, and thus do not incentivize or reward resources capable of substantially quicker response and ramp times.

Ultimately, new reserve rules—for all ancillary services—should eliminate arbitrary definitions of reserve categories common in current market designs, which reference the operational characteristics of the technologies thought best able to provide that category of reserves. Instead, market categories and rules should signal system needs—such as response time and location, ramp rate, and duration of service delivery—and reward resources capable of best satisfying those needs, regardless of technology. Rules based on system needs rather than incumbent technological characteristics will ensure that resources are compensated on terms that are not unduly discriminatory or preferential. And the increased competition in the provision of ancillary services will enhance market efficiency and ensure just and reasonable wholesale rates. Ancillary service provision will become more cost-effective, while many traditional generators will be freed to do what they do best: generate energy.

B. Incorporating Storage into Resource Adequacy Mechanisms

FERC must amend its regulations under the FPA to ensure that qualified storage resources will be considered equally alongside conventional generation and demand-side resources in capacity markets and resource adequacy planning. Certain storage technologies can perform functions comparable to resources that participate in capacity markets, while increasing system reliability and efficiency, and mitigating the system’s environmental impact. Requiring ISO/RTOs to consider storage as a capacity resource will enhance the competitiveness of organized wholesale markets and remove barriers to the participation of energy storage resources, thus ensuring just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential wholesale rates.

Resource adequacy is the ability of the electric system to supply and deliver the total quantity of electricity demanded at any given time taking into account scheduled and unscheduled outages of system elements. In practice, resource adequacy requirements focus on procuring capacity to satisfy peak load

\(^{280}\) See id. at 33.
The ISO/RTOs set capacity procurement targets to satisfy NERC’s “one day in ten year” standard, under which system planners should ensure adequate capacity such that, under a probabilistic analysis, demand will exceed available capacity no more than once every ten years. Thus, taking into consideration locational differences and related energy security needs, the primary resource adequacy consideration is simple: whether anticipated peak summer and winter capacity exceed, by a safe margin, the forecast peak summer and winter load. If not, then the ISO/RTO will adjust the administrative capacity market demand curve, and/or increase the capacity procurement targets for the responsible utility or LSE, expressed simply in MWs of capacity.

Because resource adequacy focuses on the bulk power system’s ability to satisfy peak demand, and storage devices are capable of functioning as peaking resources, storage should qualify as capacity resources in capacity markets and resource adequacy requirements. Indeed, perhaps because of its long history, PSH is permitted to participate in some capacity markets, but other storage resources with comparable operational characteristics are not. Unequal treatment for resources capable of comparable performance is a hallmark of a discriminatory rule in wholesale electricity markets. For example, FERC recently mandated that ISO/RTOs permit demand response resources to participate, under certain conditions, in organized wholesale energy, capacity, and ancillary service markets on comparable terms with conventional generation-side resources. FERC’s reasoning was simple: if a demand-side resource is

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281 See, e.g., James F. Wilson, Reconsidering Resource Adequacy-Part 1, Pub. Util. Fort., April 1 2010, at 33. (“Electric utilities and regional transmission organizations (RTOs) in the United States aim to have enough electric generating capacity to meet anticipated peak loads with a reserve margin for reliability.”)


283 See, e.g., NYISO 2012 Reliability Needs Assessment (September 18, 2012), at C-1 (“In order to perform the 2012 [Resource Needs Assessment], a forecast of summer and winter peak demands and annual energy requirements was produced for the years 2013 - 2022.”), available at http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/markets_operations/services/planning/Planning_Studies/Reliability_Planning_Studies/Reliability_Assessment_Documents/2012_RNA_Final_Report_9-18-12_PDF.pdf.

284 The demand curve in capacity markets is administratively determined based on the resource adequacy planning analysis.

285 Demand response is a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to induce lower consumption of electric energy. See O

286 In Order No. 719, the Commission required ISO/RTOs to accept bids from demand response resources in markets for certain ancillary services on a basis comparable to other resources. To qualify, demand response resources must: (1) be technically capable of providing the ancillary service and meet the necessary technical requirements; and (2) submit a bid under the generally-applicable bidding rules at or below the market-clearing price, unless the laws or regulations of the relevant electric retail regulatory authority do not permit a retail customer to participate. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 (Oct. 28, 2008), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008), order on reh’g, Order No. 719-A, 128 FERC ¶ 61,059, at P47 (2009). The order applies “to competitively-bid markets, if any, for energy imbalance, spinning reserves, supplemental reserves, reactive supply and voltage control, and regulation and frequency response”. Id. at P49. More recently, in Order 745, the
operationally comparable to a supply-side resource (in providing energy, capacity, or ancillary services), the resources should participate and be compensated comparably. The Commission’s reasoning is apt here: storage resources are comparable to conventional generation and demand-side resources, in that each can function as a capacity resource capable of meeting peak capacity needs, and thus storage should be permitted to participate in capacity markets on comparable terms.

Focusing on demand response resources in capacity markets is illustrative. The ISO/RTOs have developed rules for permitting demand response resources, many of which are duration-limited, to participate in capacity markets. For example, PJM permits “Limited Demand Resources” to participate in its Reliability Pricing Model. Such resources must commit to at least ten interruptions of demand during a given commitment period, with a minimum capable duration of six hours each. Remarkably, PJM does not permit storage resources with comparable capabilities to participate in its capacity market, e.g. a storage device capable of six hours of discharge at some specified capacity. This contradiction is magnified considering that storage resources can participate in PJM’s capacity market so long as they bid as demand response resources. For example, if storage were deployed behind the meter, and utilized by a load during peak hours to reduce the load’s effective demand on the grid, the storage device could be used as the basis for a Limited Demand Response capacity resource in PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model. That a storage device would qualify as a capacity resource if presented as a demand resource, but not if presented as supply-side capacity, further indicates that the operational characteristics of certain storage resources are consistent with capacity resources and should be

Commission required each RTO and ISO in which demand response participates in its energy market to pay a demand response resource the market price for energy, also referred to as the locational marginal price ("LMP"), when two conditions are met. First, the demand response resource must have the capability to balance supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource. Second, dispatch of the demand response resource must be cost-effective as determined by a net benefits test. The “net benefits” condition is intended to address what is known as the “billing unit effect” of dispatching demand response. By decreasing load, demand response decreases the LMP. However, by decreasing load, demand response also decreases the number of billing units over which utilities recover their costs. Accordingly dispatching demand response may result in an increased cost per billing unit ($/MWh) to the remaining wholesale load. See Demand Response Comp. in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61187 (Mar. 15, 2011).

See id. at P119 (“This Final Rule addresses the need for organized wholesale energy markets to provide compensation to demand response resources on a comparable basis to supply-side resources when demand response resources are comparable to supply-side resources, so that both supply and demand can meaningfully participate.”).

Under an earlier PJM tariff, the RTO established only one demand response category, defined identically to Limited Demand Response. In December of 2010, it sought permission to amend its tariff to include two additional demand response products, both of which would be available an unlimited number of times each year, during the entire year, for minimum durations of ten hours each interruption. See Demand Resource Products Alternative Order, 134 FERC ¶ 61,066.

considered alongside generation and demand-side resources in resource adequacy planning.

FERC has explicitly required the ISO/RTOs to permit behind-the-meter generation to qualify as a demand response resource capable of participating in capacity markets. Order No. 719 states that “the Commission has not excluded from eligibility any type of resource that is technically capable of providing [an] ancillary service, including a load serving entity’s . . . or eligible retail customer’s behind-the-meter generation . . . resource.” Likewise, in an Order No. 745 compliance filing, FERC required MISO to amend its proposed demand response resource categories to clarify that each category would include “Behind the Meter Generation.” FERC’s interpretation of its demand response orders is appropriate: behind-the-meter generation and other distributed resources can be dispatched to reduce effective load or provide ancillary services in a manner indistinguishable—from a grid-operational perspective—from an actual reduction or adjustment in consumption. Taking one-step further, FERC should require comparable treatment of energy storage performing as capacity, in addition to storage performing—with identical operational characteristics—as duration-limited demand response.

While bidding as a demand response resource is a backdoor into capacity markets, it is insufficient. Market rules for demand response resources are tailored to load-side curtailment, and would impose arbitrary and unnecessary limits on storage opportunities. For example, if distributed storage resources are categorized as demand response to bid into capacity markets, but also seek to participate in energy markets, they will be limited by the net benefits test. But unlike demand response resources, distributed storage could behave as dispatchable distributed generation. When selling wholesale power to the grid, storage would not trigger the billing unit effect because the number of billing units over which utilities recover their costs would not decrease; indeed, it would increase. Similarly, to perform as a demand response resource, storage must be distributed on the distribution-side of the grid, whether on the community level or at a load site. But storage resources are capable of a variety of other modes of deployment. Quite simply, the demand response market rules do not fit all of the operational characteristics and opportunities of storage resources, and thus the demand-response backdoor is an incomplete means for storage to access capacity payments.

One must, however, acknowledge that energy storage differs fundamentally from other capacity resources, particularly traditional generators, energy efficiency, and duration-unlimited demand response. Those resources contribute to the long-term, indefinite balance of supply and demand, while storage, which is duration- and energy-limited, can only contribute to short-term,

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290 See Order 719, supra note __, at P56.
292 See supra note __, discussing Order 745 and the “net benefits test”.
293 The dispatchability of a charged energy storage resource distinguishes it from other forms of distributed generation, namely solar PV, which is non-dispatchable.
marginal balancing. In an age before variable renewable resources, traditional generators were capable of providing both firm capacity—i.e. resources to meet (and exceed) peak demand—and flexibility necessary to ensure system quality—i.e. through ancillary services. Ensuring system quality requires not only raw MWs of capacity, but particular operational characteristics, such as quick and accurate response and fast-ramping. With the increasing penetration of variable generation, traditional resources will no longer be adequate for ensuring the moment-to-moment, marginal balance of supply and demand. Fast, accurate, and flexible resources, including many storage technologies, will become critical to ensuring system quality in the near future. Thus, system quality and resource flexibility has become not merely an operational concern for which grid operators must dispatch resources in real-time, but also an investment consideration for which operators should plan in advance through resource adequacy processes. But storage resources do not fit neatly into a planning framework based on simple MW of capacity. Understandably, to include storage as “capacity” without qualification is uncomfortable within a long-term planning framework. But capacity markets and resource adequacy requirements that only consider duration- and energy-unlimited resources (with the contradictory exception of limited demand response) will underincentivize and thus forego the possible efficiency, reliability, and environmental gains of deploying grid storage.

This discussion illustrates that for meeting peak capacity requirements and ensuring system quality there is no basis for excluding storage from resource adequacy planning, but because it is duration- and energy-limited, storage should perhaps be addressed through an independent planning mechanism. For the sake of discussion, let’s call one option “Energy Storage Capacity” (“ESC”). Establishing an ESC product is preferable to requiring that storage participate as a conventional capacity resource because ISO/RTOs could assess through the resource adequacy planning process an independent target for ESC, considering the unique operational characteristics of storage resources—e.g., flexible, fast-ramping, up and down regulation, energy- and duration-limited—in light of system needs. Indeed, in requiring the ISO/RTOs to permit demand response in capacity markets, FERC approved the creation of independent demand response capacity categories. Moreover, FERC approved PJM’s proposal to distinguish between and set independent procurement targets for “annual resources” (generation, unlimited demand response, and energy efficiency) and “limited resources” (limited demand response) By setting independent ESC targets, ISO/RTOs would be able to manage and incentivize ESC resources to meet peak load capacity and ensure system quality with the superior flexibility of storage resources. 

295 See generally KEMA, supra note __.
296 See id.
297 CPUC has effectively instituted this policy. See D. 13-02-015, adopted February 23, 2013.
299 See id. at 29.
capacity targets to incentivize firm capacity resources necessary to ensure long-term resource adequacy, such as unlimited demand response, energy efficiency, and generation. By planning for an optimal resource mix that includes flexible storage resources, ISO/RTOs could ensure reliability while integrating renewables, avoid unnecessary capital investment, and ultimately deliver power at lower cost.

The current definition of resource adequacy—which one-dimensionally values quantities of capacity, without regard to operational qualities, particularly flexibility—must be reformed. One option, described above, is to create a separate ESC capacity product. Another option for ISO/RTOs might be a mechanism that distinguishes between firm capacity on the one hand, and—more broadly than ESC—“Flexible Capacity” (“FC”) on the other. An FC product would be defined not by technology type per se, but rather by operational system needs. FC would include energy- and duration-limited resources like storage, in addition to flexible traditional generators. The need for FC will continue to grow as the penetration of variable resources increases and net load becomes more volatile. But existing capacity markets do not properly account for the varying operational characteristics of different resources. FERC has remedied undue discrimination in the frequency regulation markets, but without a mechanism for recouping fixed costs, resources capable of providing the flexibility necessary for the integration of renewables will not be adequately incentivized. Meanwhile, natural events capable of temporarily compromising the bulk power system have and will continue to become more frequent with climate change, but the traditional one-dimensional resource adequacy paradigm fails to account for resources like storage capable of providing resiliency in the event of a significant emergency or contingency. Thus, FERC might consider requiring the ISO/RTOs to study whether it would be beneficial to create an FC resource adequacy product, to ensure the adequacy of flexible resources necessary to satisfy future system needs.

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300 Including energy storage within the general capacity resource category could also incentivize installation of storage beyond optimal levels. The marginal utility of energy storage may decrease as it forms a greater part of the capacity mix because, ultimately, storage does not generate energy. But the general capacity mechanism would not provide corresponding price signals because storage would be incentivized equally alongside traditional generation resources. At some point, hypothetically, storage capacity would cause increasing operational costs and ultimately exceed the capacity of generation resources available to charge storage during off-peak hours. This note is intended merely to serve as a conceptual illustration of how storage may have diminishing marginal utility: the day, if ever, that storage forms such a substantial portion of capacity is far off indeed. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 139 FERC ¶ 61130, at P12 (May 17, 2012) (proposing a benefits factor in implementing Order No. 755, “because there are decreasing marginal benefits from each additional MW” of frequency regulation from storage).

301 The CPUC is currently considering a flexible capacity procurement requirement, to serve precisely this function. See CPUC, Briefing Paper: A Review of Current Issues with LongTerm Resource Adequacy, at 25 (February 20, 2013) (noting that “some demand response and energy storage resources are[] fast responding, and may be able to provide a significant amount of flexibility for the grid”), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/E2A36B6A-977E-4130-A83F-61E66C5FD059/0/CPUCBriefingPaperonLongTermResourceAdequacyBriefingPaperFebrua.pdf.
Ultimately, it is beyond the scope of this Article to argue how the ISO/RTOs should accommodate energy storage in resource adequacy planning.\textsuperscript{302} But it is clear that FERC must remedy unduly discriminatory barriers to storage in organized wholesale markets, where traditional resources enjoy preferential capacity mechanisms. In Order No. 1000, FERC recognized the need to give “comparable consideration” to transmission and non-transmission alternatives.\textsuperscript{303} It is time to require the analogue in resource adequacy planning and capacity markets. Storage with operational characteristics comparable (and often superior) to traditional generators and demand response must be considered comparably in capacity markets and resource adequacy planning.

\textit{C. Some Classification Considerations}

Advanced storage technologies are amorphous. They provide multiple grid benefits and exhibit operational characteristics that cut across existing regulatory and jurisdictional boundaries. As discussed above, FERC has cautiously approached the classification of storage devices on a case-by-case basis. It is time for the Commission to clarify—through a policy statement or rulemaking—the factors it will consider in (1) classifying storage resources, (2) determining whether and how a storage device may avail itself of multiple types of revenue streams, and (3) establishing mechanisms necessary to prevent cross-subsidization and over-recovery. In doing so, FERC must afford regulatory flexibility. To bind new and more nimble resources to rules tailored to the rigid operational characteristics of legacy technologies is arbitrary, and will inhibit more efficient wholesale markets and result in unjust and unreasonable rates.

First, the threshold classification question: should energy storage be fit into existing regulatory categories (generation, transmission, and/or distribution), or should a stand-alone storage functional classification be created? While attractive on its face, the latter option of creating a stand-alone storage category does not resolve deeper substantive questions. An independent storage category would superficially consolidate accounting for storage costs and assets, and perhaps make accounting and cost-of-service rate setting more convenient.\textsuperscript{304} But for instance, it’s not clear how a stand-alone storage product would enhance the operation of organized wholesale markets. On the one hand, storage resources

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{303} See Order No. 1000, \textit{supra} note \_\_, at P155. \textit{Cf.} Order No. 890 (“non-generation resources” must be considered comparably alongside generation resources in ancillary service markets).
\item \textsuperscript{304} It is important that storage receive independent consideration in the Commission’s accounting protocols. I don’t, however, consider it important how. For instance, the recent NOPR proposes to add various expense accounts for storage to each of the existing functional classifications. This has the virtue of being flexible, affording operators significant leeway in deploying and accounting for storage costs and assets. On the other hand, a consolidated energy storage functional classification might superficially make it easier to manage storage-related financial and operational data. On this point, I’m agnostic, but ultimately do not consider it as important as the substantive issues discussed herein.
\end{itemize}
perform a variety of critical grid functions better than traditional generators. But ensuring that compensation practices account for speed and accuracy will level the playing field for storage resources in those existing markets—both inside and outside regions with ISO/RTOs.

The only stand-alone storage service that does not fit neatly into an existing regulatory product is a time-shifting service. For example, a storage unit might bid into an organized market for storing energy at a per-MWh cost, plus a duration cost. The most likely time-shifting customer would be a generator storing off-peak energy for retrieval during peak hours. A transmission utility could likewise offer a time-shifting service under regulated rates as an open-access transmission service, to transfer energy through time just as traditional transmission services transfer energy through space. In that case, however, storage might simply be categorized as a transmission service, as it is in the natural gas context.\(^{305}\) And as with natural gas storage, independent storage operators might offer time-shifting storage services as negotiated rates to transmission utilities and generators.\(^{306}\) Aside from this particular stand-alone product, the question of a “stand-alone” storage classification seems superficial. Moreover, FERC declined to create an independent storage asset category in its recent NOPR, and most commentators supported that decision.\(^{307}\)

The classification question does, however, matter for determining whether and how storage fits into certain planning and procedural rules. For instance, if a storage facility is considered generation, then it might seek interconnection under the SGIP/SGIA or LGIP/LGIA, but if a storage is considered transmission, then it would have to comply with transmission-related interconnection requirements. Likewise, planning requirements differ. If a storage device is considered generation, then it should be able to participate in resource adequacy planning and capacity markets, and if the storage device is considered transmission, then it should be considered through transmission planning under Orders Nos. 890 and 1000. If FERC were to create an entirely new asset category, then all of these practical questions would also need resolution. But because each of the particular operational characteristics can be comfortably accommodated in existing categories, with their attendant procedures and requirements, the costs and uncertainty of creating a new category may exceed the benefits. The complication, of course, is that while each operational characteristic in isolation fits into existing categories, the total operational characteristics of a given storage device exceed any given category.

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\(^{305}\) See Re Pipeline Serv. Obligations, Order No. 636, 59 FERC ¶ 61030 (Apr. 8, 1992).

\(^{306}\) Modifying the Avista policy will ease the provision of market-based services to transmission utilities. For an explanation of natural gas storage, see EIA, U.S. Underground Natural Gas Storage Developments: 1998-2005 (October 2006), available at http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/feature_articles/2006/ngstorage/ngstorage.pdf. If a time-shifting product were created, the question does remain how to functionally classify it. The question is not just academic. If it were a merchant transmission facility, for example, then it would be FERC-jurisdictional and might be eligible for incentives, but would have to go through a cumbersome transmission planning process. On the other hand, if it were generation then it would be easier to interconnect, but the facility itself would not be subject to FERC jurisdiction.

\(^{307}\) See Storage NOPR, supra note __.
Accordingly, the second and more difficult issue is whether, and if so how, the Commission should permit a given storage device to perform multiple grid functions and access multiple value streams, while preventing cross-subsidization or over-recovery. Studies have recognized that storage resources are already cost-competitive resources, so long as they are permitted to access multiple value streams and benefit the grid in a variety of ways. This problem does not arise where a merchant energy-storage provider owns and operates a storage device, selling services in a wholesale market and/or through a bilateral contract with a transmission utility. But take, for example, a large battery deployed by a regulated transmission utility, for frequency regulation and voltage control. The utility expects the battery will primarily perform such ancillary grid functions, and seeks regulated-rate recovery for the device. However, during the peak days of summer, the utility intends to sell energy from the batteries to LSEs downstream at negotiated rates. The precise classification of the battery is less relevant than the policy for integrating cost-based and market-based recovery mechanisms for a single physical asset. In answering this question, the Commission must be nimble, and without enough experience, it would premature to establish any policies that impose prior restrictions on innovation in the deployment of storage resources. An ideal policy would ensure that energy storage resources are not arbitrarily restricted from maximally benefiting the grid and accessing multiple revenue streams.

One non-arbitrary restriction would protect against over-recovery, which distorts markets, and cross-subsidization of one customer-base by another, which raises consumer fairness concerns. One option is asset partitioning. The utility could receive cost-of-service transmission for some pro rata share of battery-related costs, and pursue market-based rates with the portion of battery resources not devoted to transmission. However, the logistics of designing and policing the rates for a partitioned storage device are problematic. FERC has approved multiple rates for a single device based on partitioned assets, but in those cases, no single asset performed a function under more than one rate. The battery in our hypothetical, however, would at times be devoted to transmission services, and at other times energy service, making FERC precedent an awkward fit. And attempting to apportion the device before the fact might not correspond with actual revenues, and thus could result in cross-subsidization or over-recovery.

A better option, based on actual rather than projected revenues, might be to include the entire battery in the utility’s transmission rate-base. Then permit market-based transactions for energy as well, but revenue from the market-based transactions would then flow back to reduce the regulated rates charged to transmission customers, with a portion retained by the utility as incentive to maximize market revenues. But FERC would have to ensure that the utility does

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308 See DOE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY STORAGE FOR GRID BALANCING AND ARBITRAGE: PHASE 1, WECC, at xii (June 2012) (noting that storage will require additional revenue streams such as capacity payments to be viable), available at http://energyenvironment.pnnl.gov/pdf/PNNL-21388_National_Assessment_Storage_Phase_1_final.pdf.

309 See Linden VFT, supra note __, and accompanying text.
not distort market prices by bidding lower than other, non-subsidized market participants. For example, the utility could be a price taker, only able to accept the LMP but not able to bid into the market. FERC might also establish a rule permitting the storage device to engage in market-based transactions only where the storage device’s transmission services are not required to satisfy reliability requirements, thereby prioritizing reliability over profit-seeking. This model of permitting incremental market transactions from an otherwise rate-regulated asset also fits better into FERC precedent. The Commission has authorized utilities to sell excess capacity and energy from rate-based generation; authorizing the market-based sale of energy from rate-based storage seems indistinguishable.

A related wrinkle is how the Commission should permit a given storage device to perform both distribution-side (i.e. non-jurisdictional) and transmission-side or wholesale generation-side (i.e. jurisdictional) functions simultaneously, while avoiding cross-subsidization or over-recovery. The problem posed is in many regards identical to the problem of multiple value streams discussed in the preceding paragraphs, but here the device and/or its activities are partially outside the Commission’s jurisdiction. The divided jurisdiction makes the solution proposed above (offsetting regulated rates with market-based revenues) impracticable because the cost-of-service rates are set by state regulators. This puzzle implicates federalist concerns and practical barriers more complicated than simple divided rate recovery. But the question is critical: distributed storage is considered among the most promising modes of grid deployment. While largely within the states’ jurisdiction, the Commission’s policies will also affect distributed deployment, by permitting or inhibiting additional revenue streams and grid benefits. It is crucial that FERC initiate a proceeding to clarify through a collaborative stakeholder process—including local and state regulators—how distributed energy storage might participate in FERC-jurisdictional activities.

A final issue among classification problems is in what circumstances an ISO/RTO should be permitted to operate a storage device, while maintaining independence and not unduly affecting market competition. Under Orders Nos. 888 and 2000, ISO/RTOs must maintain independence from market participants to ensure healthy competition and undistorted market signals. If an ISO/RTO

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310 This is how demand response participates in energy markets under Order No. 745. See Order No. 745, supra note __.
311 [CESA comments on Storage NOPR].
312 See supra section II.D., discussing the CES example.
313 Five of DOE’s sixteen ARRA-funded storage pilots are distributed storage projects. See EAC 2012, supra note __, at 31. See also CEC 2020, supra note __, at 167-78.
were to have a stake in market outcomes, and were thus a profit-seeking entity, its role as impartial grid operator and market manager would be compromised. The Commission indicated in *Nevada Hydro* that permitting an ISO/RTO to operate a PSH facility might compromise its independence because the ISO would have to buy energy from the market to charge and discharge the facility and would be incentivized to consider energy prices. In *Western Grid*—where an applicant proposed batteries as transmission assets to be operated by CAISO—the Commission distinguished *Nevada Hydro* on the grounds that CAISO would not manage the storage devices’ charge and would not retain any net revenues from buying or selling energy. Thus, at a minimum, it seems that for an ISO/RTO to manage a storage device as a transmission asset, the ISO/RTO must be indifferent to energy prices in deciding when to charge or discharge the device. One option is the *Western Grid* mechanism, where a third-party manages charge and revenues, and any net revenues are credited to regulated-rate. Another might be to functionally separate storage-related operations within an ISO/RTO, such that storage operators are screened from real-time energy price information, with any net revenues credited or charged to customers. One might object that, with either mechanism, the ISO/RTO would still have an undue ability to affect market prices. However, while an ISO/RTO’s control of storage resources could affect market prices, its operational control over any transmission facility impacts related markets. The ISO’s/RTO’s ability to affect prices using a storage device is conceptually and practically indistinguishable from any decision relating to the construction or operation of a new transmission wire, tower, substation, transformer, switch, or other facility, so long as the decision is indifferent to (and perhaps entirely ignorant of) market prices.

Ultimately, this Article has merely charted some of the thornier questions faced by FERC and stakeholders. How the Commission resolves these questions must be determined through a notice and comment process involving all relevant stakeholders. That these questions are ripe for resolution, however, is beyond question.

**D. Incorporating Energy Storage into Transmission Planning**

Under Order No. 1000, FERC should ensure comparable consideration of storage alongside traditional transmission infrastructure as a solution to meeting public policy-driven transmission needs, and as a transmission or non-transmission alternative to traditional infrastructure in satisfying identified transmission needs.

Order No. 1000’s mandate to consider “public policy requirements” most obviously informs regional transmission-line planning necessary to link new renewable generation to load. While a storage resource cannot connect a distant wind farm to a load center, it can help integrate variable renewable resources


315 See supra, section II.D.
316 See id.
317 See id.
Driven by public policy requirements. Deployed to smooth output or provide frequency control on lines with high levels of variable resources, storage could be an effective transmission solution to a public policy-driven transmission need, as an alternative to new transmission line interconnections. Moreover, transmission planning must consider public policy-driven transmission needs other than those related to renewables. Energy storage is itself a public policy requirement in some places, most notably California. Thus, to the extent that storage is a cost-effective or otherwise prudent solution to resolving a transmission issue, in a state like CA with an energy storage policy requirement, it should be preferred to traditional transmission line infrastructure.

Storage resources could also be considered “non-transmission” alternatives and should thus be considered comparably alongside traditional lines in transmission planning. Properly deployed, storage can resolve identified transmission needs comparably to traditional lines, for example, by alleviating congestion and servicing remote load centers. A refrain throughout this Article is that storage resources must be considered comparably alongside legacy technologies performing comparable functions; Order No. 1000 makes this mandate clear in the context of transmission planning.

While Order No. 1000 seems to mandate comparable consideration of storage resources in transmission planning, other practical considerations may make it yet more appealing than traditional lines. As is widely recognized, local and state incentives are not aligned with regional transmission needs, yet state and local governments retain exclusive jurisdiction over the siting and permitting of new transmission lines. Meanwhile, FERC has only extremely limited “backstop” authority to override state or local resistance to a proposed interstate transmission project. This “federalism mismatch”, which permits parochial interests to veto projects of regional and national concern, has stymied interstate transmission-line development critical for regional reliability and renewables integration. Because storage devices are self-contained, intra-state facilities only subject to the jurisdiction of one state, storage may be a solution to the

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318 One technique for integrating renewables and mitigating the impact of variability is to further integrate the grid on a regional scale. The larger the grid, the less effect variability has on system quality. Storage could be an alternative to new transmission lines intended to provide such regional interconnection for system quality purposes.

319 Relatedly, some commenters have persuasively argued that local, state, and federal demand response and energy efficiency initiatives are likewise public policies that must be considered in regional transmission planning to ensure that transmission is not over-built. See Shelley Welton, Michael B. Gerrard, FERC Order 1000 As a New Tool for Promoting Energy Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 11025, 11027 (2012).


321 See Piedmont Envtl. Councilv. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 310 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that FERC does not have backstop jurisdiction when a state commission withholds approval of a permit application for over one year).

322 See id. See also generally Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in Power, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 87 (2012).
gridlock surrounding interstate transmission infrastructure, posing a practically easier solution than traditional lines.\textsuperscript{324}

At the very least, where storage is not a replacement for transmission lines (as in the case of distant renewable resources), it is a complementary option for planning and upgrading the transmission system. Whether the Commission treats storage as a transmission or non-transmission resource is ultimately irrelevant: transmission and non-transmission solutions must be considered comparably. So regardless of which bucket storage falls into, FERC should ensure that storage is considered comparably alongside traditional lines in planning the transmission infrastructure of tomorrow.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Over the next twenty years, generation, transmission, and distribution systems in the United States will require between $1.5 and $2 trillion dollars of investment.\textsuperscript{325} FERC’s policies relating to interstate transmission and wholesale power sales will significantly affect the decision making processes of market actors, regulated utilities, state regulators, consumers, and other stakeholders who, collectively, will bear the costs and reap the benefits of these investments. FERC’s antiquated rules and categories threaten to stymie investment in storage technologies that will be critical on the smart, resilient, reliable, clean, and efficient grid of tomorrow. Unless and until FERC acts, resources will continue to be invested in legacy technologies that may fit more comfortably into existing regulations, but provide less value at higher costs in the real world and ultimately result in higher prices for consumers.

The time for FERC to act is now. The federal government is pouring billions of dollars into storage research, development, and demonstration, while state policies promoting storage and/or renewables have intensified the demand for flexible, grid-deployed storage resources. In the Commission’s own words, some storage technologies are already cost-effective, particularly where permitted to access multiple revenue streams by providing multiple grid services. And while other technologies are still developing, deferring action by arguing that storage resources are not yet mature is a red herring—the only way to know whether storage is effective is in a market with just and reasonable rules. In the near-term, storage will compete with resources fueled by cheap natural gas.\textsuperscript{326} But storage technology will improve and system needs for flexibility will intensify, while

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  \item\textsuperscript{324} Indeed, the problem is severe. Order No. 890 stated that, “transmission capacity is being constructed at a much slower rate than the rate of increase in customer demand, with transmission capacity per MW of peak demand declining at an average rate of 2.1 percent per year during the period 1992 to 2002”. In the decade since, things have not improved significantly, although incentive rates have resolved some problems.
  \item\textsuperscript{326} See, e.g., Felicity Carus, Energy Storage Startups Battle Natural Gas, Looking to Asia and Europe, AOL Energy, http://energy.aol.com/2012/05/15/energy-storage-startups-battle-natural-gas-looking-to-asia-and/.
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natural gas prices will likely gradually increase from current historic lows. Regardless, FERC’s duty is not to divine who should win or lose; the Commission must simply ensure that the game is fair.